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LONG OVER-DUE PROCESS: PROPOSING A
NEW STANDARD FOR PRETRIAL DETAINEES’
LENGTH OF CONFINEMENT CLAIMS
KENDALL HUENNEKENS†
ABSTRACT
Prolonged pretrial detention poses one of the greatest unchecked
threats to due process in the United States. The Supreme Court has
never announced the proper analysis to adjudicate detainees’
allegations of prolonged detention pending trial (for criminal
detainees) or removal (for noncitizens in immigration detention
centers). Because the Court has continually ducked this constitutional
question, detainees and courts alike lack guidance regarding how to
vindicate this fundamental liberty interest.
This Note identifies the inconsistencies in the Court’s due process
jurisprudence generally, as well as the dangers intrinsic to collapsing
the standards used to evaluate pretrial detainees’ claims under the Due
Process Clause and prisoners’ claims under the Eighth Amendment. In
the wake of the Court’s holding in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, this Note
argues that the Court should expand an objective due process analysis
to detainees’ overdetention claims in place of the subjective analysis
derived from the Eighth Amendment. This Note further argues that
freedom from overdetention is a fundamental right protected by
substantive due process, and it proposes a framework with graduated
levels of scrutiny to be applied to pretrial criminal detainees’ and
noncitizens’ overdetention claims.
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INTRODUCTION
“It has long been said that a society’s worth can be judged by
taking stock of its prisons.”1 The state of the union, then, is a bleak one
indeed. Twenty percent of the global prison population is incarcerated
in the United States—a nation which houses just 4 percent of the
world’s population.2 The country’s pretrial criminal detention
population increased by 433 percent between 1970 and 2015,3 and the
total incarcerated population by a staggering 500 percent over the same
period.4 Civil immigration detention has skyrocketed in an even
shorter period of time, from an average daily population of 4,411 in
1995 to 34,127 in 2010—an increase of 674 percent.5 Of the 50,000
noncitizens that were detained by the U.S. federal government prior to
removal as of April 30, 2019, 64 percent—or 32,000—had no criminal
record.6 As of February 27, 2022, 17,984 noncitizens are held in
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) detention, and 69
percent of these individuals have no prior criminal record.7 Additional
data suggest that over half of detained noncitizens languish in civil
immigration detention despite not belonging to a mandatory detention
category.8

1. Valentine v. Collier, 140 S. Ct. 1598, 1601 (2020) (mem.) (Sotomayor, J., statement
respecting the denial of application to vacate stay).
2. Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020, PRISON POL’Y
INITIATIVE (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html [https://perma.cc/
MV2W-8S3K]; Scottie Andrew, The US Has 4% of the World’s Population but 25% of Its
Coronavirus Cases, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/30/health/us-coronavirus-toll-in-number
s-june-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/T6DK-3H44] (last updated June 30, 2020, 7:10 AM).
3. Justice Denied, VERA INST. OF JUST. (Apr. 2019), https://www.vera.org/publications/forthe-record-justice-denied-pretrial-detention [https://perma.cc/PQ8K-NRVA].
4. SENT’G PROJECT, TRENDS IN U.S. CORRECTIONS 2 (2021), https://www.sentencingproje
ct.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Trends-in-US-Corrections.pdf [https://perma.cc/7T8Q-QPCD].
5. THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PRETRIAL DETENTION AND MISCONDUCT IN
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS, 1995–2010, at 1 (2013), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pdmf
dc9510.pdf [https://perma.cc/K4RE-G2AF].
6. Growth in ICE Detention Fueled by Immigrants with No Criminal Conviction, TRAC
IMMIGR. (Nov. 26, 2019), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/583 [https://perma.cc/C3Z97T2Z].
7. Immigration Detention Quick Facts, TRAC IMMIGR. (Nov. 26, 2019), https://trac.syr.edu/
immigration/quickfacts [https://perma.cc/KG98-X75X].
8. See Phillip L. Torrey, Rethinking Immigration’s Mandatory Detention Regime: Politics,
Profit, and the Meaning of “Custody,” 48 MICH. J.L. REFORM 879, 882–83 (2015) (“Between 2009
and 2011, over half of all immigrant detainees had no criminal records. Of those with any criminal
history, nearly 20 percent were merely for traffic offenses.” (quoting The Math of Immigration

HUENNEKENS IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

LONG OVER-DUE PROCESS

3/21/2022 1:52 PM

1649

Mass pretrial detention imposes harms at the individual and
societal levels. Discussing restrictions on detained individuals’
liberties, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote, “When the prison gates
slam behind an inmate, he does not lose his human quality.”9
Prolonged pretrial detention, however, launches an assault on the
detainee’s humanity by depriving them of their “life, liberty, or
property”10 before they are ever convicted of a crime.11 Where a
detainee12 is denied bail or does not have the financial means to pay
the price that is set on their freedom, they risk losing their source of
employment and income.13 The defendant’s family relationships and
reputation in their community may be irrevocably damaged by a
prolonged stay in pretrial detention.14 Prolonged time in detention
prior to a defendant’s trial increases the risk that the detainee will be
convicted.15 None of these harms are compensable upon acquittal,16
and these perverse incentives encourage more innocent defendants to

Detention, NAT’L IMMIGR. F. (Aug. 22, 2013), https://immigrationforum.org/article/mathimmigration-detention [https://perma.cc/T7AF-VWRU])).
9. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 428 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring).
10. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 2.
11. As the Supreme Court explained,
The time spent in jail awaiting trial has a detrimental impact on the individual. It often
means loss of a job; it disrupts family life; and it enforces idleness. Most jails offer little
or no recreational or rehabilitative programs. The time spent in jail is simply dead time.
Moreover, if a defendant is locked up, he is hindered in his ability to gather evidence,
contact witnesses, or otherwise prepare his defense. Imposing those consequences on
anyone who has not yet been convicted is serious.
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532–33 (1972).
12. This Note addresses the two most common forms of ostensibly temporary detention by
the federal government. Where this Note refers to detainees generally, it references both detained
pretrial criminal defendants and noncitizens in removal proceedings. Other categories of
detention, including the civilly committed and noncitizens detained following a removal order or
throughout asylum proceedings, are beyond the scope of this Note.
13. United States v. Motamedi, 767 F.2d 1403, 1414 (9th Cir. 1985) (Boochever, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
14. Id.
15. Will Dobbie, Jacob Goldin & Crystal S. Yang, The Effects of Pretrial Detention on
Conviction, Future Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108 AM.
ECON. REV. 201, 203 (2018) (“[P]retrial release decreases the probability of being found guilty by
14.0 percentage points . . . suggest[ing] that initial pretrial release affects case outcomes primarily
through a strengthening of defendants’ bargaining positions before trial, particularly for
defendants charged with less serious crimes and with no prior offenses.”).
16. Motamedi, 767 F.2d at 1414 (Boochever, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“Society has no mechanism to recompense an individual for income lost or damages to a career
due to pretrial confinement. Nor do we compensate the individual and his family for their mental
suffering and loss of reputation due to pretrial incarceration.”).

HUENNEKENS IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1650

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

3/21/2022 1:52 PM

[Vol. 71:1647

plead guilty.17 The dangers of pretrial detention are not isolated to a
detainee’s time behind bars.18 Nor are the consequences isolated to the
detained individuals. The exploding pretrial detention population costs
U.S. taxpayers $38 million per day.19 Civil immigration detention alone
costs taxpayers upwards of $3 billion per year.20
If conditions prior to the COVID-19 pandemic were hellish, the
prison system descended further into Dante’s inferno as the pandemic
swept through the prison system. Federal judges described the
government’s disregard for the health of vulnerable pretrial detainees
at the outset of the pandemic as “‘an outrage,’ ‘deliberate indifference,’
‘Kafkaesque,’ ‘illogical,’ ‘alarming,’ ‘unfathomable,’ ‘offen[sive] [to
the] Court,’ and ‘shocking.’”21 More than 661,000 inmates had
contracted COVID-19 in jails and prisons throughout the United
States as of April 2021.22 Further, the pandemic killed prisoners at
higher rates than it did the general population.23 Of the 231 inmates
17. See Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences
of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 785–86 (2017) (presenting data that 17
percent of pretrial detainees in Harris County, Texas, “would not have been convicted but for
their detention” and “suggest[ing] that [the detainees] pleaded guilty simply to go home, not
because of the strength of the case against them”).
18. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (“The consequences of prolonged
detention may be more serious than the interference occasioned by arrest. Pretrial confinement
may imperil the suspect’s job, interrupt his source of income, and impair his family
relationships.”). See generally Dobbie et al., supra note 15 (finding that pretrial detention
decreases formal sector employment).
19. Total Cost of Pretrial Detention Estimated at up to $140 Billion Annually, PRISON LEGAL
NEWS (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2018/jan/31/total-cost-pretrialdetention-estimated-140-billion-annually [https://perma.cc/28JW-WC2R].
20. 5 Reasons To End Immigration Detention, NAT’L IMMIGR. JUST. CTR. (Sept. 14, 2020),
https://immigrantjustice.org/research-items/policy-brief-5-reasons-end-immigrant-detention [https://
perma.cc/J978-6MNH].
21. Letter from David Patton & Jon Sands, Fed. Pub. & Cmty. Defs. Legis. Comm., to Cong.
3 (May 11, 2020), https://www.fd.org/sites/default/files/covid19/other_resources/2020.05.11_
letter_from_fd_to_congress_fixed.pdf [https://perma.cc/G3ZC-FGJQ] (quoting federal judges’
condemnation of the government for failing to adequately protect incarcerated individuals during
the COVID-19 pandemic).
22. Coronavirus in the U.S.: Latest Map and Count, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2021, 7:51 AM),
https://eji.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/04-16-21-Coronavirus-in-the-U.S._-Latest-Map-andCase-Count-The-New-York-Times.pdf [https://perma.cc/7AM5-99BT].
23. Eddie Burkhalter, Izzy Colón, Brendon Derr, Lazaro Gamio, Rebecca Griesbach, Ann
Hinga Klein, Danya Issawi, K.B. Mensah, Derek M. Norman, Savannah Redl, Chloe Reynolds,
Emily Schwing, Libby Seline, Rachel Sherman, Maura Turcotte & Timothy Williams,
Incarcerated and Infected: How the Virus Tore Through the U.S. Prison System, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
10, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/04/10/us/covid-prison-outbreak.html [https://
perma.cc/DKE3-6DB5]; see also Editorial, America Is Letting the Coronavirus Rage Through
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who died in Texas correctional facilities from COVID-19, nearly 80
percent were pretrial detainees.24 Conditions were just as egregious in
federal immigration detention centers. Men and women who risked
their lives to reach the United States begged to be deported as
conditions deteriorated.25 In sum, the COVID-19 pandemic
highlighted what detained individuals have long known—conditions
within jails, prisons, and immigration detention centers in the United
States are abysmal at best, and life-threatening at worst.
Court closures, judicial backlogs, and prison lockdowns left
detained individuals without remedy or redress as courts grappled with
the public health threat posed by releasing detainees back into the
community, delaying bail hearings and release.26 Jury trials across the
country were postponed due to the impossibility of jurors gathering
safely, leaving individuals ineligible or unable to afford bail vulnerable

Prisons, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/21/opinion/sunday/
coronavirus-prisons-jails.html [https://perma.cc/6VG6-C6JY] (“The case rates among inmates
are more than four times as high as those of the general public, and the death rate is more than
twice as high.”).
24. Jerusalem Demsas, 80 Percent of Those Who Died of Covid-19 in Texas County Jails
Were Never Convicted of a Crime, VOX (Nov. 12, 2020, 2:50 PM), https://www.vox.com/2020/11/
12/21562278/jails-prisons-texas-covid-19-coronavirus-crime-prisoners-death [https://perma.cc/ARC49WBC]. In an American Civil Liberties Union report grading state-by-state responses to the
COVID-19 pandemic on factors such as efforts to reduce the jail population and regular testing
of inmates, no state received higher than a D-. EMILY WIDRA & DYLAN HAYRE, ACLU, FAILING
GRADES: STATES’ RESPONSES TO COVID-19 IN JAILS & PRISONS 3 (2020), https://www.aclu.org/
sites/default/files/field_document/failing_grades_states_responses_to_covid-19_in_jails_prisons_
063020.pdf [https://perma.cc/HH24-YLPR].
25. Sam Levin, ‘We’re Gonna Die’: Migrants in US Jail Beg for Deportation Due to Covid-19
Exposure, GUARDIAN (Apr. 4, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/04/
us-jail-immigrants-coronavirus-deportation [https://perma.cc/3Z42-AW5K].
26. See Simone Weischelbaum, Can’t Make Bail, Sit in Jail Even Longer Thanks to
Coronavirus, MARSHALL PROJECT (May 1, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/
2020/05/01/can-t-make-bail-sit-in-jail-even-longer-thanks-to-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/9WXMKG93] (detailing New York’s elimination of six-day limit on jailing individuals preindictment
given the inability to assemble grand juries); Alan Feuer, Nicole Hong, Benjamin Weiser & Jan
Ransom, N.Y.’s Legal Limbo: Pandemic Creates Backlog of 39,200 Criminal Cases, N.Y. TIMES
(June 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/22/nyregion/coronavirus-new-york-courts.html
[https://perma.cc/N37Q-UE2B] (highlighting the suspension of New York’s speedy trial law and
citing jurists’ concern that “a prolonged delay in resuming trials could violate the Constitution”);
Nicole Hong & Jan Ransom, Only 9 Trials in 9 Months: Virus Wreaks Havoc on N.Y.C. Courts,
N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/02/nyregion/courts-covid.html [https://perma.cc/
4BD5-3YBR] (last updated Dec. 3, 2020) (“More than 400 defendants have been waiting inside
New York City jails for over two years for their cases to be resolved, according to the mayor’s
office.”).
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to infection.27 The threat is not over—as vaccination rates lag in
prisons, each day that an individual languishes in detention increases
the danger that they will contract COVID-19 under the state’s care.28
The pandemic has escalated the danger posed by pretrial detention
while simultaneously stripping safeguards meant to guard against its
abuse.29 This Note cites the failures of the current criminal and
immigration detention regimes to grapple with the exigencies of the
pandemic not as a unique phenomenon, but to illustrate the endemic
problem of overcrowded, underfunded pretrial and immigration
detention facilities—which, while de jure regulatory, are de facto
punitive.

27. Courts Suspending Jury Trials as Covid-19 Cases Surge, U.S. CTS. (Nov. 20, 2020), https://
www.uscourts.gov/news/2020/11/20/courts-suspending-jury-trials-covid-19-cases-surge [https://
perma.cc/FP7Z-JQHP]. See generally Court Orders and Updates During Covid-19 Pandemic, U.S.
CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-website-links/court-orders-and-updatesduring-covid19-pandemic [https://perma.cc/V62C-L42V] (last updated Dec. 2, 2021) (providing
updates on federal court operations); Burkhalter et al., supra note 23 (describing widespread
cancellation of trials and hearings that left individuals who were unable to post bail “languishing
in jails with a heightened risk of exposure”).
28. Ann Hinga Klein & Maura Turcotte, Vaccinations Are Lagging at Many U.S. Prisons,
Where Major Virus Outbreaks Have Been Common, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2021), https://
www.nytimes.com/2021/05/22/us/covid-prison-vaccine.html [https://perma.cc/N4DA-Q7JD] (noting
that incarcerated individuals “have been more than three times as likely as other Americans to
become infected with the virus”); see also A State-by-State Look at 15 Months of Coronavirus in
Prisons, MARSHALL PROJECT (July 1, 2021, 1:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/
05/01/a-state-by-state-look-at-coronavirus-in-prisons [https://perma.cc/F8QS-TSQF] (highlighting
that “at least 398,627 people in prison tested positive for [COVID-19],” but this number likely
reflects a significant undercount due to the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ “policy of removing cases
and deaths from its reports”); Cases Surge in an Ohio Prison, Making It a Top U.S. Hot Spot, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/20/us/coronavirus-live-news.html#link4ced1d [https://perma.cc/Z9Q5-7J53] (“Despite warnings from health officials and attempts
to release some inmates to avoid outbreaks, jails, prisons and detention centers have emerged as
major coronavirus spreaders.”); Zak Cheney-Rice, Who ‘Deserves’ Jail During a Pandemic?, N.Y.
MAG. (Apr. 10, 2020), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/04/cook-county-jail-coronavirus.html
[https://perma.cc/59TN-HPAQ] (“[F]or many detainees, prolonged stays in jail nowadays could be
a death sentence.”).
29. Although public health considerations and the inability to gather juries safely are
indisputably of great concern, “[e]ven if the Constitution has taken a holiday during this
pandemic, it cannot become a sabbatical.” Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, No.
20A87, slip op. at 3 (Nov. 25, 2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (granting injunctive relief against
executive orders that restricted attendance at religious services on grounds that the action
infringed on churchgoers’ rights under the Free Exercise Clause). This reasoning is equally
applicable to individuals detained pending trial, if not more so given the threat to their health.
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An individual’s interest in freedom from pretrial detention is
“basic and significant.”30 In theory, “liberty is the norm, and detention
prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.”31 This
is no longer the case in practice. There is no statutory limit on the
length of civil immigration detention prior to a removal hearing,32 and
the Speedy Trial Act—intended to limit federal pretrial detention to
seventy days—is often circumvented via its “ends of justice”
continuance exception.33 The Supreme Court has declined to define the
point at which such detention transforms from regulatory to punitive
in violation of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.34 Rather, determinations of the point at which pretrial
detention has exceeded constitutional limits are discretionary and
made by judges on a case-by-case basis.35 Meanwhile, over 550,000
pretrial detainees languish in local jails and immigration detention

30. United States v. Motamedi, 767 F.2d 1403, 1414 (9th Cir. 1985) (Boochever, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
31. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987); see also United States v. BerriosBerrios, 791 F.2d 246, 250 (2d Cir. 1986) (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 6–7 (1984), as reprinted
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3189) (pointing to the Bail Reform Act’s (“BRA”) legislative history
for the “traditional presumption favoring pretrial release ‘for the majority of Federal
defendants’”).
32. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (including no temporal limit on detention prior to a removal hearing).
33. Id. § 3161(h)(7)(A). In reality, the seventy-day calculation does not include time that can
be attributed to the defendant, including hiring attorneys to familiarize themselves with their case,
trial preparation, and other time the court spends deciding pretrial motions. See, e.g., United
States v. Cunningham, 393 F. App’x 403, 405–06 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing the district court’s
invocation of the ends-of-justice exception in the Speedy Trial Act as evidence that the act was
not violated where 430 days passed between indictment and trial).
34. See, e.g., Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747 n.4 (“We intimate no view as to the point at which
detention in a particular case might become excessively prolonged, and therefore punitive, in
relation to Congress’ regulatory goal.”); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 527–31 (2003) (finding no
temporal limit on detention pending and during removal proceedings, reasoning that such
“detention ha[s] a definite termination point, [and] in the majority of cases it lasts for less than
the 90 days we considered presumptively valid in Zadvydas”); United States v. Briggs, 697 F.3d
98, 101 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[D]ue process places no bright-line limit on
the length of pretrial detention.”). This Note principally speaks in terms of the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause because it applies to pretrial criminal detainees and
noncitizens awaiting removal proceedings in federal custody. However, the analysis contained
herein is similarly applicable to state pretrial detainees through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 415 (1945) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (“To suppose that ‘due process of law’ meant one thing in the Fifth Amendment and
another in the Fourteenth is too frivolous to require elaborate rejection.”).
35. See infra note 294 and accompanying text.
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centers under undeniably punitive conditions.36 Detainees are
frequently held within the same facilities as convicted prisoners,37
despite the fact that postconviction detention is punitive in intent and
design.
“[P]urgatory cannot be worse than hell,”38 yet courts have
historically evaluated pretrial detainees’ due process claims under the
same subjective deliberate indifference standard that applies to
convicted prisoners and protects only against cruel and unusual
punishment.39 The subjective deliberate indifference standard requires
a detainee to prove that a government official acted deliberately in
violating the detainee’s due process rights, showing that the defendant
both acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind” and was aware
there was a significant risk of harm to the detainee.40 This standard is
“closely linked to the language of the Eighth Amendment, which
prohibits the infliction of ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’”41
Evaluating detainees’ due process claims under a standard premised
on the Eighth Amendment ignores the distinct constitutional
provisions (and resulting protections) that apply to pretrial detainees
and prisoners, as well as the fact that, legally, detainees “cannot be
punished at all, much less ‘maliciously and sadistically.’”42
By contrast, the objective reasonableness standard adopted by the
Court in 2015 in Kingsley v. Hendrickson43 when evaluating a pretrial
detainee’s excessive force claim against a prison official ignores the
defendant’s state of mind entirely. Rather, this standard simply
requires the detainee to demonstrate “the force purposely or
36. See Sawyer & Wagner, supra note 2; Levin, supra note 25 (describing conditions in which
forty-four detainees share one shower and two toilets and sleep roughly two feet apart from each
other).
37. See United States v. Gallo, 653 F. Supp. 320, 336 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (“The Bail Reform
Act requires that pretrial detention be imposed in a place of commitment ‘separate, to the extent
practicable, from persons awaiting or serving sentences . . . .’ When such facilities are not
available, detainees are denied the liberty consistent with the limited purpose of that detention.”
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i)(2))).
38. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 933 (9th Cir. 2004).
39. See Catherine T. Struve, The Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1009,
1025–32 (2013) (detailing varying circuits’ application of the Eighth Amendment standard to
pretrial detainees’ due process claims).
40. Miranda v. County of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 350 (7th Cir. 2018).
41. Id.
42. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 400 (2015) (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651, 671–72 (1977)).
43. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015).
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knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.”44 This shift
marks the recognition by some circuits that because “[p]retrial
detainees stand in a different position” than convicted prisoners—
given that they “are still entitled to the constitutional presumption of
innocence”—“the punishment model is inappropriate for them.”45
While some circuits have extended the objective deliberate
indifference standard to pretrial detainees’ due process claims in other
contexts,46 no circuit has extended the Kingsley analysis to pretrial
detainees’ overdetention claims.
This Note is novel in arguing for an extension of the Supreme
Court’s holding in Kingsley v. Hendrickson—and thus the application
of an objective standard—to detainees’ overdetention due process
claims. This standard should emphasize the punitive effect, rather than
the intent, of a government practice in evaluating whether detainees’
due process rights have been violated. Recognizing the fundamental
nature of an individual’s right to liberty, this Note additionally argues
for a substantive due process analysis that imposes a heightened degree
of scrutiny to the government’s asserted justifications for detaining
individuals prior to an adjudication of guilt or removal. Additionally,
this Note reconciles the circuits’ competing “length of detention”
jurisprudence between noncitizen detainees held in removal
proceedings and individuals in pretrial criminal detention. This Note is
also the first piece of scholarship to propose a model framework that
can be employed by judges both in adjudicating the claims of both
noncitizen detainees held in removal proceedings and pretrial criminal
detainees, while retaining the case-by-case approach inherent in a due
process analysis.
This Note proceeds in five parts. Part I provides an overview of
Fifth Amendment due process protections for pretrial detainees and
noncitizens held in removal proceedings, and it outlines the test to
determine whether a government restraint is regulatory or punitive.
Part II outlines the statutory framework of pretrial criminal detention,
concentrating on the Bail Reform Act of 1984 (“BRA”) and the
Supreme Court’s landmark holding in United States v. Salerno,47 which
rejected a facial challenge to the constitutionality of pretrial detention

44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 396–97.
County of Lake, 900 F.3d at 350.
Infra notes 134–37 and accompanying text.
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
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justified by the possibility of the detainee’s future dangerousness.48
Part III describes the relevant detention provisions of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (“INA”) that have produced competing
jurisprudence among the circuits and the Supreme Court as to whether
due process requires a bail hearing for noncitizens facing prolonged
detention. Part IV argues that the massive overuse of pretrial detention
in both the criminal and immigration contexts demonstrates that the
vague precedents have failed to restrain the practice to its regulatory
purpose. This Part additionally argues that the Court should expand
the objective deliberate indifference analysis announced in Kingsley v.
Hendrickson to detainees’ overdetention claims, and it should
adjudicate these claims through a substantive due process analysis
requiring a heightened degree of scrutiny. Further, Part IV analyzes
the circuits’ attempts to impose limits on mandatory detention without
bond for noncitizens in removal proceedings, finding that such
detention is similarly unconstitutional when it is not limited to
“relatively brief periods of detention.”49 Part V proposes a uniform
judicial framework to be applied in both the pretrial criminal and preremoval detention contexts to adjudicate detainees’ overdetention due
process claims.
I. FIFTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS FOR
DETAINEES
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no
individual shall be “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law”50 and prohibits punishment prior to “an adjudication of
guilt in accordance with due process of law.”51 Pretrial detention may
serve a regulatory purpose by ensuring a defendant’s appearance at
trial and preventing crime.52 Conditions of pretrial detention are thus

48. Id. at 755.
49. Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013).
50. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
51. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979).
52. United States v. Briggs, 697 F.3d 98, 101 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Permissible regulatory purposes
include ‘preventing danger to the community’ and ‘ensur[ing] [a defendant’s] presence at trial.’”
(first quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987), then quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at
536)); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (“The [INA] . . . has two regulatory
goals: ‘ensuring the appearance of aliens at future immigration proceedings’ and ‘[p]reventing
danger to the community.’”); Bell, 441 U.S. at 537 (noting that “regulatory restraints,” but not
“punitive measures,” may be imposed prior to a guilty verdict).
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constitutional so long as they are legitimately related to this purpose.
Conditions that are intended to be punitive—or are so severe that they
are punitive in effect—are prohibited by the Fifth Amendment.53
However, an individual’s due process protections weaken upon
criminal conviction, at which point the less protective Eighth
Amendment standard kicks in; as a result, punishment remains
constitutional so long as it is not “cruel and unusual.”54 Noncitizens
jailed in immigration detention centers possess the same Fifth
Amendment due process protections as pretrial detainees.55
The distinction between regulatory and punitive government
action determines what restraints the government may impose on an
individual—pretrial detainees can only be subject to regulatory
restraints, but prisoners can be punished within constitutional bounds
so long as that punishment is not “cruel or unusual.”56 No bright-line
rule defines when government action transforms from “regulatory” to
“punitive,” but the Supreme Court considered seven factors to guide

53. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 186 (1963) (concluding that the statutes in
question were punitive in nature and unconstitutional “lacking as they do the procedural
safeguards which the Constitution commands”).
54. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. As the Fifth Circuit explained in Hare v. City of Corinth, 74
F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 1996),
The constitutional rights of a convicted state prisoner spring from the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, and, with a relatively
limited reach, from substantive due process. The constitutional rights of a pretrial
detainee . . . flow from both the procedural and substantive due process guarantees of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 639 (citation omitted). Compare Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) (“[U]nder the Due
Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance
with due process of law.”), with Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (“[W]hen a prison
regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid [under the Eighth
Amendment] if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”). Postconviction
detention, by contrast, is punitive. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981) (explaining that,
in the postconviction context, conditions that are not cruel and unusual, but that are nonetheless
“restrictive and even harsh . . . are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses
against society”).
55. See, e.g., E.D. v. Sharkey, 928 F.3d 299, 306–07 (3d Cir. 2019) (explaining that the court
was “join[ing] a number of our sister Circuits in expressly holding that immigration detainees are
entitled to the same due process protections [as pretrial detainees]” (first citing Charles v. Orange
Cnty., 925 F.3d 73, 85–86 (2d Cir. 2019); then Chavero-Linares v. Smith, 782 F.3d 1038, 1041 (8th
Cir. 2015); then Belbachir v. County of McHenry, 726 F.3d 975, 979 (7th Cir. 2013); then Porro v.
Barnes, 624 F.3d 1322, 1326 (10th Cir. 2010); and then Edwards v. Johnson, 209 F.3d 772, 778 (5th
Cir. 2000))).
56. Bell, 441 U.S. at 537; Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.
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this inquiry in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez.57 Two of these factors
involve asking whether the sanction is excessive relative to its purpose
and was motivated by a punitive intent.58
The Court later applied the Kennedy factors to a pretrial
detainee’s conditions of confinement due process claim in Bell v.
Wolfish.59 In Bell, the Court laid out a test that asked whether
“particular restrictions and conditions accompanying pretrial
detention” were regulatory or punitive and, by extension, violative of
the pretrial detainee’s constitutional due process rights.60 Initially, the
Court asked whether the practice was “imposed for the purpose of
punishment.”61 In the absence of “expressed [punitive] intent,” the
Court asked whether the restriction could “rationally be connected” to
an alternative, nonpunitive purpose.62 It determined that “if a
particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably
related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without
more, amount to ‘punishment.’”63 However, if the restriction is not
rationally connected to a legitimate government purpose and appears
arbitrary, a court may infer that it is punitive and unconstitutional.64
This is an exacting standard, and Justice John Paul Stevens noted in
dissent that “[a]ny restriction [that serves a government
function] . . . could not be characterized as ‘arbitrary or purposeless’
and could not be ‘conclusively shown’ to have no reasonable relation
to the Government’s mission.”65

57. As Justice Arthur Goldberg explained in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144
(1963),
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has
historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding
of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—
retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a
crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is
assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose
assigned are all relevant to the inquiry . . . .
Id. at 168–69 (citations omitted).
58. Id.
59. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 539.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 585 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Eight years later, the Court considered these factors to determine
whether pretrial detention without bail based on a finding of future
dangerousness amounted to a punitive condition in violation of the
detainee’s due process rights.66 In United States v. Salerno, the Court
held that “the mere fact that a person is detained does not inexorably
lead to the conclusion that the government has imposed punishment,”67
and that the pretrial detention of a La Cosa Nostra mob boss served
the government’s legitimate interest in protecting the community from
future crime.68 The Court placed great emphasis on its understanding
of the BRA’s mandatory detention provision as “operat[ing] only on
individuals who have been arrested for a specific category of extremely
serious offenses.”69 The Court declined to recognize any temporal limit
on pretrial detention imposed by the Due Process Clause,70 despite
Marshall’s protest that the potential for indefinite detention created by
the statute was “consistent with the usages of tyranny and . . .
incompatible with the fundamental human rights protected by our
Constitution.”71 Applying rational basis review to the facial challenge
to the BRA, the Court reasoned that pretrial detention was not
“excessive in relation to the regulatory goal [of community safety]
Congress sought to achieve.”72 Importantly, the Court did not confront
a prolonged pretrial detention claim; as a result, it did not specify the
level of scrutiny that it would apply in that context.
Detention of pretrial criminal defendants has multiplied in the
decades since the Salerno decision.73 Lacking clear guidance from the
Supreme Court, the circuits have split over both the appropriate
analysis for detainees’ overdetention due process claims and the line at
66. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746–51 (1987). As a note, courts adjudicating due
process claims today do not apply the Kennedy analysis to determine case-by-case whether
pretrial detention in the specific case is punitive versus regulatory—Salerno established that, de
facto, pretrial detention is constitutionally valid when accompanied by the procedural safeguards
enumerated in the BRA. Id. at 747–48. Rather, courts look to the presence of other factors
including the length of detention and nonspeculative length of future detention—among others—
in assessing whether a detainee’s due process rights have been violated as a result of their
overdetention. See infra notes 292–96, for a greater discussion of the courts’ consideration of these
factors.
67. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746.
68. Id. at 749.
69. Id. at 750 (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 747 n.4.
71. Id. at 755 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 747 (majority opinion).
73. See supra notes 4–6.
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which detention becomes punitive in violation of the detainees’ Fifth
Amendment due process rights.74
II. PRETRIAL CRIMINAL DETAINEES
This Part is divided into two sections. Section A details the
relevant statutes surrounding pretrial detention and their intersection
with federal pretrial criminal detainees’ Fifth Amendment due process
and Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights. Section B discusses two
circuit splits that have emerged in adjudicating pretrial detainees’
length-of-detention claims. The first is whether a substantive or
procedural due process analysis should be employed in evaluating
detainees’ due process claims based on prolonged pretrial detention.
The second split involves whether an objective unreasonableness or
subjective deliberate indifference standard should be applied to
detainees’ due process claims.75
A. The Statutory Framework
1. The Bail Reform Act of 1984. The BRA enumerates the
procedures for federal pretrial criminal detention.76 Congress was
spurred to amend the original, 1966 version of the BRA due to rising
crime in the United States throughout the 1970s and 1980s.77 The 1984
amendments to the BRA marked a shift from the statute’s original
mandate that judges release individuals under the “least restrictive
conditions” possible prior to trial by enabling judges to deny bail due
to perceived threats of flight risk or public safety.78 Additionally,
Congress expanded the list of crimes that subject alleged criminals to
pretrial criminal detention.79 The amended statute ultimately gave
judges more discretion to grant or deny bail based on their own
findings of dangerousness, resulting in “both a rise in the number of
74. See infra Part II.B.
75. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 391–92, 395 (2015).
76. Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142.
77. Stephanie Wykstra, Bail Reform, Which Could Save Millions of Unconvicted People from
Jail, Explained, VOX (Oct. 17, 2018, 7:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/17/
17955306/bail-reform-criminal-justice-inequality [https://perma.cc/NPY6-GZVD].
78. Id.; Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, title II, § 203(a), 98 Stat. 1837, 1976–81
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–3150).
79. Alexa Van Brunt & Locke E. Bowman, Toward a Just Model of Pretrial Release: A
History of Bail Reform and a Prescription for What’s Next, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 701,
732 (2018).
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pretrial detainees and an increase in racial disparities among those who
were locked up.”80
In theory, the statute now requires imposition of the least
restrictive conditions that will ensure the detainee’s appearance at trial
and the safety of the community,81 and it permits pretrial detention
only where “no condition or combination of [alternate] conditions” will
suffice.82 In making a bail determination, the statute instructs the court
to consider the nature of the charged crime, the weight of evidence
against the defendant, the individual’s “history and characteristics,”
potential danger to the community, and risk of flight.83 For certain
violent crimes, there is a rebuttable presumption that the defendant
should be detained pretrial, and the burden shifts to the detainee to
produce evidence of their nondangerousness and that they are not a
flight risk.84 If the judge denies bail, they must include “written findings
of fact and a written statement of the reasons for the detention”85 and
order that the individual be confined before trial “in a corrections
facility separate, to the extent practicable, from persons awaiting or
serving sentences.”86 While the Act seems to provide for an array of
procedural safeguards, it is watered down in practice—many judges
abide by fixed bail schedules that assign bond based on the charged
offense and render bond decisions in assembly line hearings lasting
only a few minutes per defendant, where most defendants are not
represented by counsel.87
In addition to these standards, courts turned to a rarely used
provision of the BRA during the COVID-19 pandemic.88 Under
80. Id. at 738; Bail Reform Act § 203(a).
81. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1) (“[If] the judicial officer finds that no condition or
combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and
the safety of any other person and the community, such judicial officer shall order the detention
of the person before trial.”).
82. Id.
83. Id. § 3142(g).
84. Id. § 3142(e)(3).
85. Id. § 3142(i)(1).
86. Id. § 3142(i)(2).
87. Heaton et al., supra note 17, at 729, 773, 779; Cynthia E. Jones, “Give Us Free”:
Addressing Racial Disparities in Bail Determinations, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 919, 933
(2013).
88. See, e.g., United States v. Kennedy, 449 F. Supp. 3d 713, 718 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (holding
release under § 3142(i) was “necessary for the compelling reason that it will protect Defendant,
the prison population, and the wider community during the COVID-19 pandemic”), denying
reconsideration No. 18-20315, 2020 WL 1547878 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 1, 2020).
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§ 3142(i), temporary release following the denial of bail may be
permitted only where “necessary for preparation of the person’s
defense or for another compelling reason.”89 Section 3142(i) “has been
used sparingly”90 and is not broadly protective of pretrial detainees’
liberty rights. A court in the Southern District of New York cited
§ 3142(i) in reasoning that “the continued confinement of individuals
being held to ensure that they appear at their immigration proceedings
. . . does not serve the public’s interest,” given the pandemic.91 A court
in the Eastern District of Michigan similarly remarked that “the only
reasonable response by [the government] is the release of [p]etitioner”
because “any other response demonstrates a disregard of the specific,
severe, and life-threatening risk to [p]etitioner from COVID-19.”92 In
a postpandemic world, § 3142(i) of the BRA could be used as a vehicle
to revisit a judge’s decision to detain an individual on a periodic basis,
as it allows a judge to analyze whether conditions have changed such
that a detainee would not pose a flight risk or threat to the community.
However, it is unclear whether judges would be receptive to the
increased use of this previously obscure and underutilized provision of
the BRA.
2. The Speedy Trial Act of 1974. A separate constitutional
protection—the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right93—is relevant to
any discussion of pretrial detainees’ overdetention claims. A pretrial
detainee’s Sixth Amendment speedy trial right is distinct from a claim
that their due process rights under the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendments have been violated due to prolonged pretrial detention.

89. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i).
90. United States v. Hamilton, No. 19-CR-54-01 (NGG), 2020 WL 1323036, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 20, 2020); see also United States v. Lee, 451 F. Supp. 3d 1, 5–6 (D.D.C. 2020) (describing the
“limited prior authority regarding . . . temporary release under section 3142(i)” and how “few
courts” have used it “sparingly”); United States v. Acevedo-Baldera, No. 3:18-CR-00155 (AWT),
2020 WL 9156933, at *8 (D. Conn. Nov. 23, 2020) (noting that “a medical condition may be
considered a ‘compelling reason’ for temporary release” but citing Hamilton for the proposition
that § 3142(i) has been “sparingly used”).
91. Valenzuela Arias v. Decker, No. 20 CIV. 2802 (AT), 2020 WL 1847986, at *9 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 10, 2020).
92. Malam v. Adducci, 452 F. Supp. 3d 643, 660 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (emphasis added).
93. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial . . . .”); see also Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 374–75 (1969)
(concluding that the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right “is enforceable against the States as ‘one
of the most basic rights preserved by our Constitution’” (quoting Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386
U.S. 213, 226 (1967))).
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The Speedy Trial Act,94 which codifies the federal speedy trial right,
applies regardless of whether an individual is detained pretrial,95 while
an overdetetention claim levied under the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights requires the continued detention of a
defendant.
Congress enacted the Speedy Trial Act shortly following the
Supreme Court’s holding in Barker v. Wingo.96 In Barker, the Court
declined to impose a bright-line rule to determine whether an
individual’s speedy trial rights under the Sixth Amendment were
violated; instead, the Court proposed four factors that should be
considered.97 The Act requires that a defendant’s trial commence
within seventy days from the later date of either the public filing of the
information or indictment or the defendant’s most recent appearance
before the court.98 An indictment must be filed within thirty days of
arrest99—limiting pretrial detention, in theory, to one hundred days.
However, this requirement “has turned out to be illusory,”100 and the

94. Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161.
95. The Speedy Trial Act clock tolls upon the date of a defendant’s arrest or indictment
(whichever comes first) and runs until their trial—it does not stop if a defendant is released on
bail pending on trial. See id. § 3161(c)(1) (providing that an individual should be brought to trial
within seventy days of the latest date of either their indictment or their appearance before the
court in which that charge is pending); id. § 3161(h) (listing excludable types of delay when
computing time under the Act). The Barker Court recognized that prejudice (one of the four
factors the court will consider in weighing whether a defendant’s Sixth Amendment speedy trial
rights have been violated) may result from trial delay even where a defendant is released on bail,
reasoning that “a defendant confined to jail prior to trial is obviously disadvantaged by delay as
is a defendant released on bail but unable to lead a normal life because of community suspicion
and his own anxiety.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 527 (1972); see also Moore v. Arizona, 414
U.S. 25, 27 (1973) (per curiam) (recognizing that pretrial prejudice includes the potential to
“disrupt [the defendant’s] employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations,
subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and his friends,” and “may
seriously interfere with the defendant’s liberty, whether he is free on bail or not” (quoting United
States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971))).
96. Barker, 407 U.S. at 514; Speedy Trial Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-619, title I, § 101, 88
Stat. 2079. In addition, forty states and the District of Columbia have enacted their own speedy
trial guarantees that provide additional recourse for state detainees. Speedy Trial Rights, NAT’L
CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Apr. 24, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-andcriminal-justice/speedy-trial-rights.aspx [https://perma.cc/5QBJ-M3Y8].
97. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530–32 (proposing a balancing test that considers the “[l]ength of
delay, the reason for the delay,” whether the defendant has invoked their speedy trial right, and
resulting prejudice to the defendant as a result of the delay in bringing them to trial).
98. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1).
99. Id. § 3161(b).
100. United States v. Accetturo, 783 F.2d 382, 394 (3d Cir. 1986) (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
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statute has not lived up to its purpose of “effectuat[ing] the Speedy
Trial provision of the Sixth Amendment.”101 This is largely due to the
nine exclusions built into the Act102—especially the catch-all exclusion
that permits judges to grant continuances to the “ends of justice.”103
There is no statutory limit on how many such continuances may be
granted, and the circuits have split on the question.104 District court
judges throughout the country regularly cited this provision when
tolling the Speedy Trial Act during the COVID-19 pandemic due to
the impossibility of holding jury trials and bail arraignments, despite
the potential for abuse of this provision by district attorneys.105 This
practice illuminated the significant due process problem that can arise
when a district court judge has unlimited discretion to detain an
individual to further the “ends of justice.”106 This is exacerbated by the
unlikely probability of rebuke by an appellate court that may only
reverse a district court’s decision for clear error and given the Supreme
Court’s failure to impose an explicit temporal limit on pretrial
detention.107
B. Judicial Interpretation of Pretrial Detention Claims
As discussed in Part I, the Supreme Court held in Salerno that
pretrial detention does not violate substantive due process where it is
101. Id.
102. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (listing the nine exceptions).
103. Id. § 3161(h)(7)(A). See generally Greg Ostfeld, Note, Speedy Justice and Timeless
Delays: The Validity of Open-Ended “Ends of Justice” Continuances Under the Speedy Trial Act,
64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037 (1997) (addressing the lack of an explicit time limit requirement for endsof-justice continuances and ambiguity surrounding when such continuances should be granted).
104. See Ostfeld, supra note 103, at 1042–52 (outlining circuit split).
105. See, e.g., Administrative Order Regarding Computation of Time Under the Speedy Trial
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, No. 2:20mc7, 2020 WL 1430429, at *2 (E.D. Va. Mar. 23, 2020) (“[T]he
ever-expanding risk of exposure to COVID-19 . . . causes it to be practically impossible to seat a
jury and/or obtain a quorum of grand jurors while maintaining compliance with the current public
health and safety recommendations from the [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention] and
the President.”); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 8.202 (2020) (New York governor’s
executive order suspending limits on pretrial detention until petit juries can be safely assembled).
106. United States v. Sheikh, 493 F. Supp. 3d 883, 888, 890 (E.D. Cal. 2020) (denying ends of
justice continuance on grounds that it would “amount to kicking the can down the road” and
dismissing case without prejudice where defendant had waited two years for trial and the
government requested an additional six-month continuance).
107. United States v. Olsen, No. 20-50329, 2022 WL 60361, at *3 (9th Cir. Jan. 6, 2022) (“We
review de novo a district court’s decision to dismiss on Speedy Trial Act grounds and its findings
of fact for clear error. A district court’s ends of justice determination will be reversed only if it is
clearly erroneous.” (citations omitted)).
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rationally related to a legitimate government purpose and has followed
fair procedures.108 Lacking any additional guidance from the Court on
how to distinguish regulatory and punitive pretrial detention, circuits
have split on the proper test for adjudicating detainees’ overdetention
due process claims in two ways. The first split involves whether
prolonged pretrial detention violates substantive or procedural due
process.109 The second, more prominent split concerns whether pretrial
detainees are entitled to greater constitutional protections than
convicted prisoners and, by extension, merit a different analysis for
their overdetention due process claims.110
1. Substantive or Procedural Due Process. Due process rights may
be both substantive111 and procedural.112 Substantive due process rights
are “fundamental”113 and “‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and

108. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987).
109. Compare, e.g., Luckes v. County of Hennepin, 415 F.3d 936, 939–40 (8th Cir. 2005)
(considering totality of the circumstances in determining whether length of pretrial detention
shocks the conscience and violates substantive due process), with Jauch v. Choctaw County, 874
F.3d 425, 430 (5th Cir. 2017) (noting where “‘the fault lies in a denial of fundamental procedural
fairness,’ the question is one of procedural due process”).
110. Compare Villegas v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 709 F.3d 563, 568 (6th Cir. 2013)
(explaining pretrial detainees’ due process claim should be evaluated “under the same rubric as
Eighth Amendment claims brought by prisoners”), and Butler v. Fletcher, 465 F.3d 340, 345 (8th
Cir. 2006) (“Pretrial detainees and convicted inmates, like all persons in custody, have the same
right to . . . basic human needs.”), and Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1574 (11th Cir.
1985) (“Life and health are just as precious to convicted persons as to pretrial detainees.”), with
Alberti v. Klevenhagen, 790 F.2d 1220, 1224 (5th Cir. 1986) (explaining that despite pretrial
detainees and convicted prisoners being housed within the same facility, the Due Process Clause
accords greater rights to pretrial detainees), and Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982)
(explaining civilly committed detainees “are entitled to more considerate treatment and
conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to
punish”). See generally City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (noting that
pretrial detainees’ rights are “at least as great” as Eighth Amendment protections available to
prisoners).
111. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 856 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“It can no longer be controverted that due process has a substantive component as well.”).
112. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978) (“[T]he right to procedural process is ‘absolute’
in the sense that it does not depend upon the merits of a claimant’s substantive assertions, and . . .
[it is important] to organized society that procedural due process be observed . . . .”); see
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990) (“[T]he Due Process Clause contains a substantive
component that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions ‘regardless of the fairness of
the procedures used to implement them.’” (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331
(1986))).
113. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).
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tradition’ . . . ‘and conscience of our people,’”114 without which “neither
liberty nor justice would exist.”115 A substantive due process analysis
asks whether an “adequate reason”116 exists for depriving an individual
of their life, liberty, or property and recognizes that “certain
[government] actions are prohibited no matter what procedures attend
them.”117 By contrast, procedural due process rights protect an
individual against arbitrary government action, asking whether
“adequate procedures” were taken before depriving an individual of
their life, liberty, or property.118
Not all circuits have recognized that a detainee’s right to be free
from prolonged pretrial detention is a substantive due process
guarantee.119 The Seventh and Eighth Circuits have applied a
substantive due process analysis to overdetention claims, reasoning
that the analysis requires an appraisal of the totality of the
circumstances to determine whether conduct shocks the conscience.120
The Fifth Circuit has also suggested that a substantive due process
analysis may apply in the absence of clear procedural deficiencies.121
Yet, “[w]ithout deciding [that question],” the Fifth Circuit held
“prolonged-detention cases do raise the immediate question of

114. Id. at 721 (first quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501 (1977); and
then quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
115. Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937)).
116. Erwin Chemerinsky, Procedural Due Process Claims, 16 TOURO L. REV. 871, 871 (2016)
(emphasis added).
117. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 856 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
118. Chemerinsky, supra note 116 (emphasis added); see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 335 (1976) (considering “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of [a liberty interest] . . . and
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards” to determine
whether a procedural due process violation has occurred).
119. See infra note 120 (noting the circuits that have recognized freedom from excessive
pretrial detention as a right protected by substantive due process).
120. See, e.g., Holloway v. Del. Cnty. Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063, 1069–71 (7th Cir. 2012) (looking
to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether individual’s due process rights were
violated where they alleged the jail medical staff exhibited deliberate indifference to their medical
condition); Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564, 581 (7th Cir. 1998) (remarking that the inquiry
into whether an official’s action in depriving a detainee of his constitutional right shocks the
conscience given the totality of the circumstances “ultimately defines the parameters of the
Fourteenth Amendment”); Luckes v. County of Hennepin, 415 F.3d 936, 939 (8th Cir. 2005)
(adopting the Seventh Circuit’s framework in Armstrong and asking “(1) whether the Due
Process Clause prohibits the alleged deprivation of rights; (2) whether the defendants’ conduct
offended the standards of substantive due process; and (3) whether the totality of the
circumstances shocks the conscience”).
121. Jauch v. Choctaw County, 874 F.3d 425, 430–31 (5th Cir. 2017).
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whether the pre-trial detainee’s procedural due process rights have
been violated” and opted to resolve the case on those grounds.122
This distinction is significant. The Court’s recognition that
prolonged pretrial detention implicates a fundamental right rooted in
the nation’s history would determine the level of scrutiny these claims
receive—rational basis review (if not fundamental) or strict scrutiny (if
fundamental).123 “[T]he Due Process Clause contains a substantive
component that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions
‘regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement
them’”124—in other words, the procedural guarantees outlined in the
BRA that the Court upheld as facially valid in Salerno. As a result, the
Court could hold that prolonged pretrial detention violates substantive
due process and implicates a fundamental right, even where the initial
pretrial detention may not cross this threshold.125 Such a holding would
have enormous consequences for individuals in prolonged detention
whose due process rights have eroded over the length of their
confinement.
2. Reconciling the Subjective Eighth Amendment Standard with
Kingsley’s Objective Test The scope of constitutional protections
afforded to an individual—and the resulting analysis a court may

122. Id. (citing the test announced by the Supreme Court in Medina v. California, 505 U.S.
437, 443 (1992), to determine when to apply procedural due process by asking whether the state
rule of criminal procedure “offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental, or (ii) transgresses any recognized
principle of ‘fundamental fairness’ in operation”).
123. See infra Part IV.C (discussing how the fundamental nature of a right may affect the level
of scrutiny it receives and using Second Amendment jurisprudence as an example of such); see
also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that not all
substantive due process rights receive strict scrutiny, and rather, “only fundamental rights qualify
for this so-called ‘heightened scrutiny’ protection. . . . All other liberty interests may be abridged
or abrogated pursuant to a validly enacted state law if that law is rationally related to a legitimate
state interest”).
124. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113,
125 (1990)); see also id. (“Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action.”).
125. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750–51 (1987) (reasoning “we cannot categorically
state that pretrial detention ‘offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental’” after the Government has “prove[d]
by clear and convincing evidence that an arrestee presents an identified and articulable threat to
an individual or the community . . . .” (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934))).
The Supreme Court has not clarified whether prolonged pretrial detention implicates a
fundamental right—and, by extension, would be subject to heightened scrutiny.
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undertake—hinges on the individual’s detention status.126 Pretrial
detainees—“those who exist in the in-between” of arrestees (covered
by the Fourth Amendment) and prisoners (covered by the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment)—are
in theory covered by the due process protections of either the Fifth
Amendment (federal detainees) or Fourteenth Amendment (state
detainees).127 Coverage by different amendments, however, does not
necessarily mandate different constitutional analyses. The Supreme
Court has remarked that pretrial detainees’ rights are “at least as
great” as Eighth Amendment protections available to prisoners,128 but
cautioned that the “presumption of innocence . . . has no application to
a determination of the rights of a pretrial detainee during confinement
before his trial has even begun.”129 The Court historically evaluated
detainees’ deliberate indifference due process claims under the same
Eighth Amendment standard that applied to convicted prisoners’
claims, requiring the detainee to show that a state actor had a punitive
intent in violating the detainee’s due process rights.130 But the
collapsing of the two standards into a single analysis ignores the
Supreme Court’s own pronouncements that “Eighth Amendment
scrutiny is appropriate only after the State has complied with the

126. See Crocker v. Beatty, 995 F.3d 1232, 1246 (11th Cir. 2021) (describing which
amendments cover which individuals depending on their detention status). Relatedly, while
overdetained individuals may rely on different statutes to bring their due process claims
depending on whether they are held in federal or state custody, the resulting analysis is the same:
a detainee must show that the prison official both knew of serious harm resulting from continued
detention and disregarded that risk in denying bail to the detainee. See, e.g., West v. Tillman, 496
F.3d 1321, 1327 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding no due process violation where the detainee “pointed to
no evidence showing that [the official] subjectively knew that her acts would lead to [the
detainee’s] over-detention or that [the official] disregarded any such risk”).
127. Crocker, 995 F.3d at 1246 (quoting Piazza v. Jefferson County, 923 F.3d 947, 952 (11th
Cir. 2019)).
128. City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983).
129. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979). Compare Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 165–
66 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment [is] relevant to conditions of pre-trial detainees only
because it establishe[s] a floor.”), with Hart v. Sheahan, 396 F.3d 887, 893 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[W]hen
the issue is whether brutal treatment should be assimilated to punishment, the interests of the
prisoner [are] the same whether he is a convict or a pretrial detainee.”), and Hamm v. DeKalb
County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1574 (11th Cir. 1985) (“Life and health are just as precious to convicted
persons as to pretrial detainees.”).
130. See supra note 40 and accompanying text; Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 391–92
(2015) (replacing the subjective deliberate indifference standard modeled on the Eighth
Amendment that was previously used for detainees’ excessive force claims with an objective
unreasonableness standard).
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constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal
prosecutions,” and “the State does not acquire the power to punish
with which the Eighth Amendment is concerned until after it has
secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process
of law.”131
In Kingsley v. Hendrickson, the Court reasoned that a detainee
challenging the excessive use of force by a prison official needed only
show “objective evidence that the challenged governmental action is
not rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective or that it
is excessive in relation to that purpose.”132 This framing of the rational
basis standard was notably different than that announced in Bell, in
which the Court held that where “a particular condition or restriction
of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental
objective, it does not, without more, amount to ‘punishment.’”133
Following Kingsley, the circuits grappled with how to extend this
new objective inquiry to other types of pretrial due process claims. The
Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have rejected the subjective
Eighth Amendment standard in favor of the objective Kingsley
standard in cases involving detainees’ inadequate medical care
claims.134 By contrast, the Third, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits have declined to extend Kingsley beyond detainees’ excessive

131. City of Revere, 463 U.S. at 244 (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671–72 n.40
(1977)). For additional discussion of the overlap between the analyses for detainees under the
Fifth and Eighth Amendments, see generally Rosalie Berger Levinson, Kingsley Breathes New
Life Into Substantive Due Process as a Check on Abuse of Government Power, 93 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 357 (2017) and David C. Gorlin, Note, Evaluating Punishment in Purgatory: The Need To
Separate Pretrial Detainees’ Conditions-of-Confinement Claims from Inadequate Eighth
Amendment Analysis, 108 MICH. L. REV. 417 (2009).
132. Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 398 (emphasis added).
133. Bell, 441 U.S. at 539.
134. Bruno v. City of Schenectady, 727 F. App’x 717, 720 (2d Cir. 2018) (reasoning that the
Second Circuit’s adoption of Kingsley’s objective indifference standard in a conditions of
confinement decision (Darnell) mandates the same objective standard for detainees’ inadequate
medical care claims); Brawner v. Scott County, 14 F.4th 585, 596 (6th Cir. 2021)
(“Given Kingsley’s clear delineation between claims brought by convicted prisoners under the
Eighth Amendment and claims brought by pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment,
applying the same analysis to these constitutionally distinct groups is no longer tenable.”);
Miranda v. County of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 352 (7th Cir. 2018) (extending the Kingsley objective
unreasonableness standard to pretrial detainees’ inadequate medical care claims); Gordon v.
County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[L]ogic dictates extending the objective
deliberative indifference standard . . . to medical care claims.”).
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use of force claims.135 The Second Circuit stands alone in extending
Kingsley to pretrial detainees’ conditions of confinement claims.136
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit is the only circuit that has applied the
objective unreasonableness standard to detainees’ failure-to-protect
claims.137 No circuit has considered extending the Kingsley objective
unreasonableness analysis to a detainee’s overdetention due process
claim.
An example of the subjective deliberate indifference analysis as
applied to a pretrial detainee’s prolonged detention claim arose in the
Eleventh Circuit. In West v. Tillman,138 the Eleventh Circuit reasoned
that a detainee alleging overdetention in violation of his Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights needed to show that officials were

135. See, e.g., Moore v. Luffey, 767 F. App’x 335, 340 n.2 (3d Cir. 2019) (declining to extend
Kingsley’s objective unreasonableness standard to inadequate medical care claims and remarking
that application of either the objective unreasonableness or deliberate indifference standard
would not affect the outcome given failure to show more than negligence); Alderson v. Concordia
Par. Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 419 n.4 (5th Cir. 2017) (declining to extend Kingsley’s objective
deliberate indifference standard to failure-to-protect claims and pointing to petitioner’s failure to
even properly raise this claim); Whitney v. City of St. Louis, 887 F.3d 857, 860 n.4 (8th Cir. 2018)
(reasoning that Kingsley does not control outside of excessive force cases); Strain v. Regalado,
977 F.3d 984, 991 (10th Cir. 2020) (declining “to extend Kingsley to Fourteenth Amendment
deliberate indifference claims” and reasoning that “the nature of [such] claim[s] infers a subjective
component”), cert. denied, No. 20-1562, 2021 WL 4509029 (U.S. Oct. 4, 2021); Dang v. Seminole
County, 871 F.3d 1272, 1279 n.2 (11th Cir. 2017) (reasoning that the petitioner’s inadequate
medical care claim was not squarely covered by Kingsley and, even if it was, the petitioner’s claim
“is, at most, negligence” which falls “categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due
process” (quoting Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 396)); De Veloz v. Miami-Dade County, 756 F. App’x 869,
876 (11th Cir. 2018) (applying Eighth Amendment subjective deliberate indifference standard to
a pretrial detainee’s conditions of confinement claim and remarking that “the standards under
the Fourteenth Amendment are identical to those under the Eighth”). But see Bowles v. Bourbon
County, No. 21-5012, 2021 WL 3028128, at *8 (6th Cir. July 19, 2021) (declining to “contribute to
the circuit split on the relevant test” where detainee’s inadequate medical care claim would fail
under both the objective unreasonableness and subjective deliberate indifference standards).
136. See Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 30 (2d Cir. 2017) (concluding “that the Supreme
Court’s decision in Kingsley altered the standard for deliberate indifference claims under the Due
Process Clause” and applying Kingsley’s objective standard to detainee’s conditions of
confinement claim).
137. Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016) (requiring a
detainee to show that an official intentionally placed the detainee in conditions that put him at
risk—in this case, placing the detainee in the same cell as a dangerous inmate—and “did not take
reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable officer in the
circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved” (emphasis added)).
Contra Leal v. Wiles, 734 F. App’x 905, 911–12 (5th Cir. 2018) (dismissing a detainee’s failure-toprotect claim because he did not show the official had actual knowledge that he was the target of
a planned gang attack and purposely put him in a cell with an inmate affiliated with that gang).
138. West v. Tillman, 496 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2003).
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deliberately indifferent to his due process rights despite being aware of
a risk of serious harm and acting in disregard of that risk.139 This
framing of the issue is relevant where detainees point to a specific harm
resulting from prolonged detention—for example, prolonged exposure
to COVID-19.140 By contrast, under the objective unreasonableness
standard announced by Kingsley, the detainee would not face the same
requirement to demonstrate officials’ knowledge of the seriousness of
a risk. Instead, the detainee would just need to show a risk of prolonged
detention and that prolonged detention was excessive or not rationally
related to the government’s interest in preventing the detainee’s flight
and/or protecting the community—for example, where there were less
severe means of serving these government interests, such as through
house arrest.141
None of the current avenues available to pretrial detainees are
satisfactory to protect their fundamental right to liberty under the U.S.
Constitution. As a result, the proposed standard is designed to be more
protective of their rights than those of convicted prisoners, as intended
by the separate constitutional protections for the two categories of
individuals.
III. NONCITIZEN DETENTION IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
Like criminal defendants, noncitizens in removal proceedings
enjoy Fifth Amendment due process protections.142 Yet, noncitizens
lack the same scope of procedural rights enshrined outside the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. For example, criminal pretrial detainees
have the right to government-provided counsel,143 a “speedy and public

139. Id. at 1327.
140. See, e.g., Malam v. Adducci, 452 F. Supp. 3d 643, 660 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (accepting a
pretrial detainee’s argument that officials were subjectively aware of the danger posed by
COVID-19 to the detainee, who suffered from a severe underlying health condition).
141. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 398 (2015) (“[A] pretrial detainee can prevail
by providing only objective evidence that the challenged governmental action is not rationally
related to a legitimate governmental objective or that it is excessive in relation to that purpose.”).
142. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993) (“It is well established that the Fifth Amendment
entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.”); Wong Wing v. United States,
163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (explaining that noncitizens detained within the United States are
entitled to the full scope of protection offered by the Fifth Amendment, and “shall not be . . .
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law”).
143. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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trial,”144 and freedom from excessive bail and fines.145 By contrast,
noncitizens’ constitutional procedural rights do not extend beyond
those guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment in removal proceedings,
and these detainees have no constitutional guarantee to counsel, a jury,
or a bail hearing.146 The lack of procedural safeguards available to
detained noncitizens illustrates that “immigration detention is criminal
detention but without the constitutional protections.”147
In this Part, Section A outlines the statutory framework
surrounding noncitizen detention prior to a removal hearing and
following a removal order in the INA. Section B analyzes the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of these provisions in light of the Fifth
Amendment in Zadvydas v. Davis,148 Demore v. Kim,149 and Jennings
v. Rodriguez.150 This Part argues that the Supreme Court’s reasoning in
these respective cases is inconsistent, and it recommends a framework
to unify the Court’s treatment of noncitizens’ due process rights
regardless of the INA provision under which they are detained. This
framework is immediately relevant, as the Court is poised to decide
two cases during the 2021 term centering on the question of whether
noncitizens detained pending removal are entitled by statute to a bond
hearing.151

144. Id.
145. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
146. See Note, The Right To Be Heard from Immigration Prisons: Locating a Right of Access
to Counsel for Immigration Detainees in the Right of Access to Courts, 132 HARV. L. REV. 726,
726, 729, 740–41 (2018) (“Unlike criminal defendants, noncitizens have no Sixth Amendment
right to government counsel in immigration proceedings — only a statutory right to retained
counsel.”); AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, TWO SYSTEMS OF JUSTICE: HOW THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM
FALLS SHORT OF AMERICAN IDEALS OF JUSTICE 5–10 (2013), https://www.americanimmigration
council.org/sites/default/files/research/aic_twosystemsofjustice.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z967-TYJF]
(highlighting the lack of due process protections for noncitizens in federal detention as compared
to pretrial detainees). It is unsettled whether pretrial criminal detainees have a right to counsel at
a bail hearing. See Heaton et al., supra note 17, at 774 (describing the “open [constitutional]
question” as “whether the bail hearing is itself a ‘critical stage’” at which time a defendant has a
right to “adequate representation” (quoting Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 212
(2008))).
147. Torrey, supra note 8, at 880.
148. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
149. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
150. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018).
151. Aleman Gonzalez v. Barr, 955 F.3d 762 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. granted sub nom. Garland
v. Gonzalez, 210 L. Ed. 2d 1009 (Aug. 23, 2021) (considering whether individuals subject to final
removal orders and detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) have a right to an individualized bond
hearing after six months); Arteaga-Martinez v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, No. 19-1054, 2019 WL
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A. The Statutory Framework
The INA outlines the procedures surrounding noncitizen
detention prior to removal.152 The provisions relevant to this discussion
are 8 U.S.C. § 1231—the provision governing detention following a
final removal order that was challenged in Zadvydas v. Davis,153 and
again in the Court’s 2021 term154—and 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225–26, which
involve detention prior to a removal hearing and were challenged in
Demore v. Kim and Jennings v. Rodriguez.155 Originally passed in 1952,
the INA has been frequently amended in the seventy years since its
codification, and recent priorities have shifted to limiting unauthorized
immigration, largely at the U.S.–Mexico border.156
To be eligible for bail, a noncitizen must demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence that they are neither dangerous nor a flight risk.157
The immigration judge does not have to consider a noncitizen’s ability
to pay in setting bail, which must be at least $1,500.158 The average bail
amount for noncitizens in 2016 was $8,000, and 6.5 percent of
13031922 (3d Cir. Aug. 20, 2019), cert. granted sub nom. Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 210 L. Ed.
2d 1009 (Aug. 23, 2021) (same). In Gonzalez, the Court will also consider whether courts may
issue a classwide injunction prohibiting the government from detaining noncitizens without bond
hearings beyond six months, as opposed to making individualized determinations as to each
detainee. Gonzalez, 210 L. Ed. 2d at 1009.
152. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225–1226, 1231.
153. Id. § 1231; Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682.
154. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
155. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225–1226; Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513–14 (2003); Jennings, 138 S. Ct.
at 839.
156. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225–1226).
157. Compare 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(3) (2021) (stating that a lawfully admitted noncitizen
eligible for release on bond “must first demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that release
would not pose a danger to the safety of other persons or of property . . . [and] that the
[noncitizen] is likely to appear for any scheduled proceeding . . . .” (emphasis added)), with 18
U.S.C. § 3142(b) (“The judicial officer shall order the pretrial release of the person on personal
recognizance [or bond] . . . unless the judicial officer determines that such release will not
reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required or will endanger the safety of any
other person or the community.” (emphasis added)). While the language of the BRA favors a
presumption of bail—requiring clear and convincing evidence to continue detaining an
individual—the INA flips this presumption on its head and shifts the burden onto the detained
noncitizen, requiring clear and convincing evidence to show that they should be released.
158. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(A). This is one example of a marked disparity in the procedural
protections afforded to noncitizens and pretrial criminal detainees, given the latter’s protection
under the Eighth Amendment of freedom from excessive bail or fines. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII;
see also 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2) (“The judicial officer may not impose a financial condition that
results in the pretrial detention of the person.”).
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noncitizens’ bails were set at over $25,000.159 Noncitizens otherwise
eligible for relief may spend days, months, or weeks in detention due
to their inability to make bail.160 The INA contains no provision
requiring that an immigration judge periodically revisit their findings
to detain an individual without bail. Additionally, immigration officers
have discretion at any time in a noncitizen’s removal proceedings to
obtain or revoke a detainee’s release on bond.161
Moreover, the INA contains a mandatory detention provision for
certain classes of noncitizens detained prior to removal; this can only
be overridden by the attorney general in narrowly proscribed
circumstances.162 The class of crimes that mandate detention in the civil
detention context are broader than that in the criminal context. For
example, the BRA provides that defendants charged with certain
offenses are subject to a rebuttable presumption of mandatory pretrial
detention.163 Most of the predicate convictions carry a minimum prison
term of ten years and include offenses involving firearms, drugs,
minors, and other violent crimes.164 By contrast, a noncitizen may be
mandatorily detained prior to a removal hearing for a crime as minor
as a repeat drug misdemeanor—for example, possession of one Xanax
pill—if they are charged with recidivist possession of a controlled
substance, an “aggravated felony” under the mandatory detention

159. What Happens When Individuals Are Released on Bond in Immigration Court
Proceedings?, TRAC IMMIGR. (Sept. 14, 2016), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/438
[https://perma.cc/FS8C-MPQF].
160. For an overview of bond procedures in civil immigration detention, see generally Denise
Gilman, To Loose the Bonds: The Deceptive Promise of Freedom from Pretrial Immigration
Detention, 92 IND. L.J. 157 (2016).
161. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(b).
162. Id. § 1226(c) (identifying the classes of noncitizens that must be detained and permitting
release of such noncitizens on bond “only if the Attorney General decides . . . that release
is . . . necessary to provide protection to a witness, a potential witness, a person cooperating with
[a major criminal] investigation . . . , or an immediate family member or close associate” of one
of those persons and that the noncitizen does not pose a danger to the community or a flight risk
(emphasis added)).
163. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3) (“Subject to rebuttal by the person, it shall be presumed that
no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as
required and the safety of the community if the judicial officer finds that there is probable cause
to believe that the person committed [one of the enumerated crimes of violence listed in the
statute].”).
164. See id. § 3142(f)(1) (listing crimes of violence with maximum prison terms of more than
ten years, any offense carrying a maximum sentence of life imprisonment or death, any drug
offense carrying a term of greater than ten years, any felony involving a dangerous weapon or
firearm, and where the defendant has committed two predicate felonies).
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statute.165 Even simple possession of marijuana or petty theft can
trigger mandatory detention in certain states, even where such
possession may be legal in others.166 Immigration judges have no
discretion to grant bail to removable noncitizen detainees convicted of
certain crimes, including recidivist possession of a controlled substance
or “crimes involving moral turpitude.”167 Meanwhile, Congress has
eliminated judicial review of an immigration judge’s final removal
orders for noncitizens detained under INA’s mandatory detention
provision.168 In practice, this means that once a noncitizen has been
assigned to a mandatory detention category under the INA, they do
not have the ability to appeal a final order of removal.
Overall, the INA’s mandatory detention provision offers a
significantly less protective standard than the “rebuttable
presumption” in the BRA. While the BRA accomplishes a similar
goal—the imposition of harsher standards to obtain release from
detention for individuals charged with more severe crimes or repeat
offenses—it nonetheless permits judges to exercise discretion in
reaching a bail determination where there is clear and convincing
evidence that doing so would not override the public interest.169
Similarly, the lack of any time limit for when a noncitizen may obtain
a bail hearing after appealing a custody determination by ICE sharply
contrasts with the BRA’s requirement that the court hold a hearing
“immediately” to determine whether the defendant is eligible for
165. See Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 581–82 (2010).
166. Farrin R. Anello, Due Process and Temporal Limits on Immigration Detention, 65
HASTINGS L.J. 363, 366 n.12 (2014).
167. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B), (C) (“The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien
who . . . (B) is deportable by reason of having committed any offense covered in section
1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of this title . . . [or] (C) is deportable under section
1227(a)(2)(A)(i) of this title on the basis of an offense for which the alien has been sentence[d] to
a term of imprisonment of at least 1 year”); see id. § 1227(a) (listing classes of deportable aliens,
including those who have been convicted of a “[c]rime[] of moral turpitude” [§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)],
recidivist possession of a controlled substance [§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)]).
168. Id. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (stripping jurisdiction of any court to review final orders of removal
for certain categories of criminal noncitizens, including those detained under the INA’s
mandatory detention provision); see also MARGARET MIKYUNG LEE, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
R43226, AN OVERVIEW OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF IMMIGRATION MATTERS 3 (2013) (“[T]here is
no judicial review of removal determinations based on particular grounds of inadmissibility or
deportability . . . .” (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C))).
169. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1)–(3) (shifting the burden to the detainee to rebut the
presumption that “no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure . . . the safety
of any other person and the community” if the individual is released on bail where charged with
a certain category of crimes).
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bail.170 Although pretrial criminal detainees and noncitizens share the
same due process rights under the Fifth Amendment, noncitizens lack
the same degree of statutory oversight to ensure that such rights are
being vindicated.
A potential argument that noncitizens should not be entitled to
equal bail protections is that they have a greater incentive to skip bail
upon release. This argument, of course, extends beyond noncitizens to
detainees generally and is reflected in the belief that “an unaffordable
bail amount is the only amount sufficient to create an adequate
disincentive to flee.”171 However, data suggests that 86 percent of
noncitizens released on bail appear for court.172 Although statistics are
less readily available given the more fractured pretrial criminal system,
one study suggested that 94 percent of state criminal defendants
released pretrial return to court; another, more recent study suggests
that pretrial release may increase the likelihood of a defendant’s failure
to appear at his scheduled hearing by 15 percentage points.173 Nor do
these statistics address the difference between flight risk and failure to
appear. Rather than a flight from justice, defendants (especially those
without means) may miss hearings due to an inability to take off work,
obtain transportation or child care, or simply by confusing their court
date.174 Further, less costly supervisory mechanisms exist that could

170. Compare 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(a) (2021) (“Custody and bond determinations . . . may be
reviewed by an Immigration Judge . . . .” (emphasis added)), with 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (“The
hearing shall be held immediately upon the person’s first appearance . . . .”).
171. Heaton et al., supra note 17, at 779 (acknowledging this argument and rebutting because
“[i]f the bail is unaffordable and therefore results in detention, it is not functioning as a deterrent
at all . . . [but] as an indirect means of detention”). While outside the scope of this Note, for a
more extensive discussion of cash bail reform and the implications for pretrial detainees, see
generally Van Brunt & Bowman, supra note 79.
172. TRAC IMMIGR., supra note 159.
173. See Dobbie et al., supra note 15, at 203 (explaining study characteristics and finding that
“pretrial release increases the probability of failing to appear in court by 15.6 percentage points”).
174. See Ethan Corey & Puck Lo, The ‘Failure to Appear’ Fallacy, APPEAL (Jan. 9, 2019),
https://theappeal.org/the-failure-to-appear-fallacy [https://perma.cc/5LTZ-45CZ] (highlighting
that “‘failure to appear’ rates obscure the fact that many who miss court aren’t on the run[,]” and
rather, “people who miss court dates for reasons beyond their control are counted the same as
defendants who intentionally avoid court. . . . They might need child care, or they are just
confused by the court system. A court appearance might take place months after a ticket—long
forgotten—was issued”). See generally Lauryn P. Gouldin, Defining Flight Risk, 85 U. CHI. L.
REV. 677 (2018) (arguing for a distinction in the definitions and risk calculations of
nonappearance and flight).
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serve the government’s interest in protecting the public and ensuring
future appearance in a less burdensome manner.175
Weaker procedural safeguards afforded to noncitizens as a result
of their exclusion from constitutional guarantees enshrined outside the
Due Process Clause, including protection against excessive bail in the
Eighth Amendment and guarantee to counsel and a speedy trial in the
Sixth Amendment—coupled with Congress’s stripping back of the
remedies available to noncitizens to challenge their detention during
removal proceedings—increasingly render the promise of procedural
fairness to noncitizens illusory.
B. Judicial Interpretation
The INA lacks any ceiling on the maximum amount of time a
noncitizen may be detained prior to a removal hearing or final order of
removal.176 Noncitizens thus lack any statutory analog to the Speedy
Trial Act to limit detention prior to a removal hearing or following an
order of removal in the immigration context. As a result, they have
challenged the lack of temporal limits on detention in the INA as
violative of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause in three
landmark Supreme Court cases, with two more currently before the
Supreme Court.177

175. See Emily Kassie, Detained: How the US Built the World’s Largest Immigrant Detention
System, GUARDIAN (Sept. 24, 2019, 1:39 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/sep/24/
detained-us-largest-immigrant-detention-trump [https://perma.cc/8DKC-C4AZ] (highlighting
the existence of less costly alternatives to detention, such as electronic monitoring and regular
supervision via phone check-ins and home visits that run $4.42 per day on average); see also Fatma
E. Marouf, Alternatives to Immigration Detention, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 2141, 2161–70 (2017)
(outlining ICE’s Intensive Supervision Appearance and Electronic Monitoring Device program
as one viable alternative to detention for “high-risk individuals” and community-supervision
programs for lower-risk individuals); Supervision Costs Significantly Less than Incarceration in
Federal System, U.S. CTS. (July 18, 2013), https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2013/07/18/supervisioncosts-significantly-less-incarceration-federal-system [https://perma.cc/2ZN2-EJQE] (In 2012,
“[p]retrial detention for a defendant was nearly 10 times more expensive than the cost of
supervision of a defendant by a pretrial services officer in the federal system.” (emphasis added));
Incarceration Costs Significantly More Than Supervision, U.S. CTS. (Aug. 17, 2017), https://
www.uscourts.gov/news/2017/08/17/incarceration-costs-significantly-more-supervision [https://
perma.cc/H8Z6-ZLLX] (comparing the average annual cost of detaining one individual before
trial [$31,842] to community supervision of the individual prior to trial [$4,026]).
176. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 834 (2018) (“Nothing in the text of § 1225(b)(1) or
§ 1225(b)(2) hints that those [detention] provisions have an implicit 6–month time limit on the
length of detention.”).
177. See generally Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (considering a challenge to INA
detention time limits); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003) (same); Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S.
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In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Court recognized an implicit six-month
temporal limit on detention following a noncitizen’s final removal
order.178 The Court relied on its interpretation of the Fifth Amendment
in the pretrial criminal detention context, reiterating that prolonged
detention is warranted only where “limited to specially dangerous
individuals and subject to strong procedural protections.”179 The Court
remarked that “once the flight risk justification evaporates, the only
special circumstance present [to justify ongoing detention] is the alien’s
removable status itself, which bears no relation to a detainee’s
dangerousness.”180 However, in Demore v. Kim two years later, the
Court declined to extend this presumptive limit to noncitizens facing
mandatory detention prior to a removal hearing on the grounds that
“post-removal-period detention, unlike detention pending a
determination of removability . . . , has no obvious termination
point.”181
In Demore, the Court relied on evidence submitted by the United
States that mandatory detention pending removal proceedings
typically lasted “less than the 90 days [the Court] considered
presumptively valid in Zadvydas”—information that the government
wrote to the Court to correct thirteen years after that holding.182
Subsequently, the circuits have struggled to reconcile this decision with
increasingly prolonged periods of detention. In Rodriguez v.
Robbins,183 for example, the Ninth Circuit confronted the
constitutional problems with the INA’s mandatory detention
provision. The court rejected the government’s contention that
“under Zadvydas and Demore, mandatory detention under § 1226(c)
Ct. 830 (2018) (same). The Court is currently considering two challenges to the INA. See supra
note 151.
178. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.
179. Id. at 690–91.
180. Id. at 691–92 (emphasis added).
181. Demore, 538 U.S. at 529 (alteration in original) (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 697).
182. Id. After the Court granted certiorari in Jennings, the acting solicitor general notified the
Court to correct a misrepresentation of fact that had been made by the government in its
submissions to the Court in Demore, and upon which the Court had relied in its decision. See
Letter from Ian Heath Gershengorn, Acting Solic. Gen., to Scott S. Harris, Sup. Ct. Clerk (Aug.
26, 2016), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/580/include/01-1491%20-%20Demore%20Letter%
20-%20Signed%20Complete.pdf [https://perma.cc/VW4F-ND3N] (describing how “EOIR made
several significant errors in calculating those figures” which erroneously suggested that “‘in the
majority of cases,’ detention under Section 1226(c) ‘lasts for less than * * * 90 days’” (emphasis
added)).
183. Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013).
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without a bond hearing is permissible because such detention has a
definite termination point,”184 reasoning that “Demore’s reach is
limited to relatively brief periods of detention.”185 Instead, the court
held that the mandatory detention provision “must be construed ‘to
contain an implicit “reasonable time” limitation’” in order to avoid a
clash with the Constitution.186 The court set this limitation at six
months, “at which point the government’s authority to detain the alien
would shift to § 1226(a), which is discretionary” and would trigger an
individualized bond hearing.187 The Second Circuit agreed, holding a
bond hearing should be required to justify mandatory detention under
§ 1226(c) after six months.188 By contrast, the Third Circuit declined to
impose a “presumptive [six-month] threshold[]” due to “the highly
fact-specific nature” of a due process inquiry,189 but it held due process
required a bond hearing where the length of detention “strain[s] any
common-sense definition of a limited or brief civil detention.”190
Five years after the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court
rebuked the lower court’s attempt to “to rewrite [the mandatory
detention] statute as it pleases” in Jennings v. Rodriguez, abrogating
the circuits’ post-Demore jurisprudence.191 The Ninth Circuit had held
noncitizens detained under INA §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), 1226(c), and
1231(a) were entitled to automatic, individualized bond hearings after
six months of detention.192 Citing the lack of textual support in the INA
for a firm time limit on detention of noncitizens,193 the Court criticized
the Ninth Circuit’s use of the canon of constitutional avoidance to
reconcile the statute with the Ninth Circuit’s understanding of what
protections were owed to noncitizens by the Fifth Amendment’s Due

184. Id. at 1138.
185. Id.
186. Id. (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682).
187. Id. at 1144.
188. Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 606 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 138
S. Ct. 1260 (2018) (“[M]andatory detention for longer than six months without a bond hearing
affronts due process.”).
189. Chavez-Alvarez v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, 783 F.3d 469, 474 n.7 (3d Cir. 2015),
abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018).
190. Id. at 477.
191. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 843.
192. Id. at 842–43 (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d
1060 (9th Cir. 2015)).
193. Id.
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Process Clause.194 Ironically, the Supreme Court had done precisely
this in Zadvydas by reading an implicit six-month limitation on
postremoval detention where this language did not exist in the
statute.195 However, in Jennings, the Court explicitly limited its holding
to rejecting the statutory argument that the INA required periodic
bond hearings, so it did not foreclose the ability of noncitizens to raise
a due process challenge to alleged overdetention under the statute.196
The Third and Ninth Circuits have since held that,
notwithstanding the Court’s rejection of a periodic bond hearing
requirement for noncitizens detained pending removal proceedings
under § 1226 in Jennings, such a requirement can be read into the
postremoval statute where noncitizens have been ordered removed but
are arguing for withholding of removal and face prolonged detention
under § 1231(a)(6).197 The Third and Ninth Circuits each held that an
individualized bond hearing requirement after six months of detention
is consistent with the Court’s Zadvydas precedent and mandated by
due process.198 This framework is immediately relevant, as the Court is
194. Id. at 843.
195. Id.; see Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001) (“We do have reason to believe,
however, that Congress previously doubted the constitutionality of detention for more than six
months.”).
196. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 851.
197. See Arteaga-Martinez v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, No. 19-1054, 2019 WL 13031922 (3d
Cir. 2019), cert. granted sub nom. Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 210 L. Ed. 2d 1009 (Aug. 23,
2021); Guerrero-Sanchez v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, 905 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2018); Aleman
Gonzalez v. Barr, 955 F.3d 762 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. granted sub nom. Garland v. Gonzalez, 210
L. Ed. 2d 1009 (Aug. 23, 2021).
198. See Guerrero-Sanchez v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, 905 F.3d 208, 222 (3d Cir. 2018)
(“At a certain point, continued detention becomes . . . unconstitutional unless the Government
has justified its actions at a hearing inquiring into whether continued detention is consistent with
the law’s purposes of preventing flight and dangers to the community.” (quoting Diop v. ICE/
Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 232 (3d Cir. 2011))); see also id. at 221 (reasoning that Zadvydas
“did not explicitly preclude courts from construing § 1231(a)(6) to include additional procedural
protections . . . should those protections be necessary to avoid detention that could raise different
constitutional concerns”); Aleman Gonzalez, 955 F.3d at 773–88 (declining to hold that Jennings
overruled its circuit precedent requiring individualized bond hearings after six months under
§ 1231(a)(6) and citing Diouf v. Napolitano, 634 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2011), which held that a
noncitizen detained under § 1231(a)(6) must receive a bond hearing before an immigration
judge). The Ninth Circuit also cited its decision requiring the government to demonstrate clear
and convincing evidence that a noncitizen should continue to be detained at a bond hearing,
reasoning that “even where prolonged detention is permissible, ‘due process requires “adequate
procedural protections” to ensure that the government’s asserted justification for physical
confinement “outweighs the individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical
restraint.”’” Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Casas-Castrillon v.
DHS, 535 F.3d 942, 950 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001))).
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poised to decide two cases this term centering on whether noncitizens
may be detained for over six months without a bond hearing pending
removal.199
Given the tension between the circuits’ and the Supreme Court’s
interpretations of various INA provisions, there is a need for
clarification as to the temporal limitations imposed by due process on
prolonged detention of noncitizens in removal proceedings. The
courts’ reliance on the canon of constitutional avoidance to construe
INA provisions is not a substitute for clarity from the Supreme Court
as to what substantive and procedural due process require to justify the
prolonged detention of noncitizens in immigration detention centers.200
Given the lack of a parallel to the Speedy Trial Act in the removal
context, judicial intervention via the form of a revised analysis to
detainees’ due process claims is even more important to safeguard
noncitizens’ due process rights.
IV. A NEW SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS: APPLYING
KINGSLEY’S OBJECTIVE UNREASONABLENESS STANDARD AND
HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY TO OVERDETENTION CLAIMS
Where an individual’s fundamental right to liberty is at stake due
to prolonged pretrial detention, due process demands a more exacting
degree of scrutiny than the current rational basis standard. The
widespread use of detention prior to trial ignores both the language of
the BRA201 and the Supreme Court’s commands in the immigration

199. The Court’s holding in these cases will build upon its recent decisions in Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 844 (2018) (holding that no such periodic bond requirement could be
read into a separate provision of the INA governing noncitizens detained pending removal
proceedings under § 1226), Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513 (2003) (upholding mandatory
detention without bond hearings under § 1226(c)), and Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701
(2001) (reading an implicit six-month limitation on detention following a final order of removal
under § 1231).
200. See, e.g., Guerrero-Sanchez, 905 F.3d at 217 n.6 (“Whether Guerrero-Sanchez would be
constitutionally entitled to a bond hearing under the Due Process Clause is an entirely different
question . . . that we need not resolve today . . . .”); Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 851 (“Consistent with
our role as a ‘court of review, not of first view,’ we do not reach [the constitutional] arguments.”
(quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718 n.7 (2005))); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699
(“interpreting the statute to avoid a serious constitutional threat”).
201. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3) (pretrial detention should be ordered only where “no
condition or combination of conditions” will protect the community and ensure detainee’s
appearance at trial).
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context that detention should be “carefully limited”202 to “specially
dangerous individuals and subject to strong procedural protections.”203
The COVID-19 pandemic has magnified the punitive effects of
prolonged detention, as well as the lack of recourse available to
detainees due to the lack of meaningful, enforceable limits on
detention prior to trial or removal. Detention crosses the threshold
from regulatory to punitive at an increasingly earlier point, raising
procedural due process concerns, given extensive delays in bail
hearings and release,204 as well as substantive concerns in light of
detention conditions that shock the conscience.205 The current
statutory framework and jurisprudence have demonstrated both the
intractability of the current system in dealing with unprecedented
events and the inability to follow any prescribed judicial mechanisms
to cope with the COVID-19 pandemic.206 As a result, district courts
throughout the country have scrambled to conjure legal standards to
address the unprecedented threat to the life and liberty of detainees in
the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.207
This Part begins by examining the grave overdetention problem in
the United States and argues for evaluation of overdetention claims
under a heightened degree of scrutiny. This Part proceeds to argue that
the objective-deliberate indifference analysis adopted by the Court in
Kingsley should be extended to detainees’ overdetention due process
claims.
A. Pretrial Detention as the Norm, Not the Exception, in the
Aftermath of Salerno
The primary justifications supporting the use of pretrial detention
in both the criminal and civil contexts are the federal government’s
regulatory interests in preventing flight and protecting the
community.208 The COVID-19 pandemic has illuminated the massive
overuse of pretrial detention and its deviation from its asserted
regulatory purpose. Prison officials and attorneys general have been

202. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
203. Zadvydas, 533 U.S at 691.
204. See supra notes 21–27.
205. See supra note 21.
206. See Essien v. Barr, 457 F. Supp. 3d 1008, 1013 (D. Colo. 2020) (“[N]one of the potentially
applicable precedents was decided with [the realities of a pandemic] in mind.”).
207. See supra note 105.
208. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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forced to identify the most pressing justifications for detaining
individuals prior to trial in order to deal with the ongoing public health
emergency and overwhelmed jails. In an April 2020 memorandum
from former U.S. Attorney General William Barr to federal
prosecutors throughout the country, Barr recommended “not seeking
detention to the same degree we would under normal circumstances—
specifically, for those defendants who have not committed serious
crimes and who present little risk of flight (but no threat to the public)
and who are clearly vulnerable to COVID-19 under [Centers for
Disease Control] Guidelines.”209 The question becomes, then, why
anyone who is neither charged with a serious crime nor considered a
flight risk would ever be detained prior to trial, as Barr suggests is the
case “under normal circumstances.”210 The answer is simple—pretrial
detention is no longer the “carefully limited exception” that the
Salerno Court assumed in recognizing regulatory pretrial detention as
constitutional.211 Instead, pretrial detention is the “normal
circumstance[]”212 for the accused in the United States.
Barr’s memo demonstrates that, in many instances, the pretrial
detention regime is no longer rooted in the oft-cited justifications of a
detainee’s dangerousness and risk of flight. Rather, the heightened
standard that individuals charged with certain felonies under 42 U.S.C.
§ 3142(e) must overcome to be eligible for release on bail appears to
have transformed into the norm for all detainees seeking bail, rather
than the exception for those charged with the most dangerous crimes.
The detention of dangerous and nondangerous individuals alike signals
that the practice has become “excessive in relation to [the
government’s purpose]”213 and punitive—and by extension
unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment.
The transformation of pretrial detention from a regulatory to
punitive practice is apparent upon a closer look at who is being

209. Memorandum from Att’y Gen. William Barr to All Heads of Dep’t Components and All
U.S. Att’ys 2 (Apr. 6, 2020) [hereinafter Barr Memo], https://www.justice.gov/file/1266901/
download [https://perma.cc/Q67Q-2NSW].
210. Id.
211. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
212. Barr Memo, supra note 209.
213. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979) (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963)).
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detained prior to trial.214 One of the greatest explosions in the pretrial
detention population is among defendants charged with drug-related
offenses,215 not “individuals who have been arrested for a specific
category of extremely serious offenses.”216 In fact, none of the three
safeguards that the Court pointed to as support for the facial
constitutionality of the Speedy Trial Act’s lack of temporal limits—a
prompt hearing, limits on detention, or housing detainees apart from
convicts217—are strictly followed, and they have been largely ignored
during the COVID-19 pandemic.218
The constitutional harm to detainees is worsened by evaluating
their overdetention due process claims under an Eighth Amendment
standard designed to guard the convicted against cruel and unusual
punishment. Under the Fifth Amendment, detainees may not be
punished at all.219 However, this protection is weaker in substance than
in name. Rather, as long as a government actor can point to some
rational interest connected to the practice, it will likely pass
constitutional muster.220 Justice John Paul Stevens lambasted this

214. It is impossible to discuss pretrial detention without acknowledging insidious racial bias
that has long existed in detention decisions, and the fact that nonwhite individuals are detained
at far higher rates than white defendants. For scholarship discussing racial disparities in pretrial
detention, see Jones, supra note 87, at 942 (“[B]eing Black increases a defendant’s odds of being
held in jail pretrial by 25%.” (quoting Traci Schlesinger, Racial and Ethnic Disparity in Pretrial
Criminal Processing, 22 JUST. Q. 170, 181 (2005))), and David Arnold, Will Dobbie, & Crystal S.
Yang, Racial Bias in Bail Decisions, 133 Q.J. ECON. 1885, 1929 (2018) (finding that both Black
and white judges are racially biased against Black defendants and rely on anti-Black stereotypes
that exaggerate dangers of pretrial release of Black defendants as compared to white defendants).
215. See COHEN, supra note 5, at 4 (“[T]he number of drug defendants detained pretrial
increased by 72%, from 13,524 in 1995 to 23,232 in 2010.”).
216. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750; see also Anthony Barr & Kristen Broady, Dramatically
Increasing Incarceration Is the Wrong Response to the Recent Uptick in Homicides and Violent
Crime, BROOKINGS (Nov. 2, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2021/11/02/
dramatically-increasing-incarceration-is-the-wrong-response-to-the-recent-uptick-in-homicidesand-violent-crime [https://perma.cc/E7BL-7CWD] (noting that, despite an uptick in violent
crimes in the summer of 2020, incarceration rates for homicides and violent crime “peak[ed] in
2007, but have since been falling dramatically” and “in 2019[,] the nation’s incarceration rate was
the lowest since 1995”); see also Jones, supra note 87, at 935 (noting that “seventy-five percent of
pretrial detainees are charged with relatively minor property crimes, drug offenses or other nonviolent acts”).
217. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747–48.
218. See supra notes 93–96 and accompanying text.
219. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 537 (recognizing “a distinction between punitive measures that may
not constitutionally be imposed prior to a determination of guilt and regulatory restraints that
may” under the Fifth Amendment).
220. Id. at 539.
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standard in dissent for “provid[ing] an individual with virtually no
protection against punishment.”221 Further, Stevens argued that, by
creating a framework defined “in the far more permissive terms” of the
Eighth Amendment, the Court ignored the protection and commands
of the Due Process Clause.222
B. Applying the Kingsley Standard to Pretrial Detention Claims
One way to ensure that detainees’ overdetention claims are
viewed with greater rigor by the courts, in light of the special
constitutional protections afforded by the Due Process Clause, is for
the Court to extend the objective analysis announced in Kingsley to
pretrial detainees’ overdetention due process claims. This analysis asks
only whether the detainee’s due process rights were violated by the
overdetention, and not whether there was punitive intent by prison
officials to do so (as mandated by a subjective analysis framed in
Eighth Amendment terms).223 Extending Kingsley to detainees’
overdetention claims would have the dual effect of resolving the circuit
split surrounding the proper analysis for pretrial detainees’
overdetention due process claims, as well as recognizing the distinct
constitutional footing of the innocent and the guilty that merits a
heightened government showing to justify detention. The fact that it is
“convenient . . . to apply the same standard to claims” raised by pretrial
detainees and convicted prisoners “without differentiation” does not
make it constitutional,224 especially given the weakening of an
individual’s liberty right upon conviction under the Constitution.225
Where the interest at stake is an individual’s fundamental interest to
liberty, convenience should have no role in the analysis.

221. Id. at 585 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 586.
223. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 398 (2015) (reasoning that “Bell’s focus on
‘punishment’ does not mean that proof of intent (or motive) to punish is required for a pretrial
detainee to prevail on a claim that his due process rights were violated”).
224. Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005). While this quote refers to the
Fourteenth Amendment specifically, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment contains
identical language and is interpreted identically by the Supreme Court. See Malinski v. New York,
324 U.S. 401, 415 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“To suppose that ‘due process of law’
meant one thing in the Fifth Amendment and another in the Fourteenth is too frivolous to require
elaborate rejection.”).
225. Dist. Att’ys Off. for Third Jud. Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 68 (2009) (“A criminal
defendant proved guilty after a fair trial does not have the same liberty interests as a free man.”).
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The Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have extended Kingsley
to other types of due process claims, and their reasoning provides a
model for how this analysis should operate in the context of
overdetention.226 The Second Circuit concluded that “[a]fter Kingsley,
it is plain that punishment has no place in defining the mens rea
element of a pretrial detainee’s claim under the Due Process Clause”
because “[u]nlike a violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause [of the Eighth Amendment], an official can violate the Due
Process Clause . . . without meting out any punishment.”227 The
Seventh Circuit touched on a similar point, citing Kingsley’s explicit
acknowledgment that the language and nature of claims under a Fifth
and Eighth Amendment analysis are distinct, and holding that punitive
intent has no place in the analysis of a detainee’s inadequate medical
care due process claim.228 In Castro v. County of Los Angeles,229 the
Ninth Circuit cited “the broad wording of Kingsley,” where “[t]he
Court did not limit its holding to ‘force’ but spoke to ‘the challenged
governmental action’ generally.”230 The “underlying federal right,”
that of due process, is the same and logically should require the same
analysis across all threads of due process, including overdetention
claims.
C. Liberty From Excessive Detention Is a Fundamental Right, and
Merits Strict Scrutiny When It Has Become Prolonged
While the Court is “reluctant to expand the concept of substantive
due process,”231 it has done so across a variety of unenumerated rights,

226. See Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2017) (applying the Kingsley objective
deliberate indifference standard to pretrial conditions of confinement claim); Miranda v. County
of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 352 (7th Cir. 2018) (applying the Kingsley objective deliberate indifference
standard to pretrial inadequate medical care claims); Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118,
1124 (9th Cir. 2018) (applying the Kingsley objective deliberate indifference standard to pretrial
inadequate medical care claims).
227. Darnell, 849 F.3d at 35.
228. County of Lake, 900 F.3d at 352. By contrast, the Tenth Circuit took the opposite
approach and declined to extend Kingsley on the grounds that the claim (indifference to a
detainee’s medical needs) necessarily involved a subjective component. Strain v. Regalado, 977
F.3d 984, 991 (10th Cir. 2020).
229. Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016).
230. Id. at 1070 (quoting Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 398 (2015)).
231. Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992).
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including the right to marry,232 the right to marital privacy,233 and the
right to contraception.234 “If the ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process
Clause means anything, it means freedom from physical restraint,”235
and freedom from prolonged detention belongs to this category of
fundamental rights whose deprivation can only be justified by “a very
important
governmental
interest.”236
Treating
detainees’
overdetention claims through the lens of substantive due process does
not require the Court to “expand” substantive due process to a new
right—rather, it recognizes the fundamental freedom that a citizen is
entitled to unless they have been convicted of breaking the law. This is
at the core of the liberty right that substantive due process protects.
At the time Salerno was decided, the Court held that pretrial
detention was not, on its face, a substantive due process violation
where such detention was limited, accompanied by sufficient
procedural safeguards, and nonpenal in nature.237 Notably, the Salerno
Court emphasized the “compelling regulatory purpose of the [Bail
Reform] Act”238 and the government’s “compelling interests [in]
regulation of pretrial release”239 throughout its opinion. The Court’s
subsequent explication, then, of a rational basis test was arguably
illogical. The leniency of a rational basis standard defies common sense
where it is meant to apply in “narrow circumstances.”240 This language,
coupled with the Court’s emphasis on “compelling interests,”241 sounds
much more in line with a requirement that a practice be narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest—the strict scrutiny
standard.242
232. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of
man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival.” (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1942))). The most notable Supreme Court substantive due process decision of the last
decade is arguably Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015), which recognized a fundamental
right of same-sex couples to marry via a substantive due process and equal protection analysis, id.
at 675.
233. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–86 (1965).
234. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453–54 (1972).
235. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 288 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
236. Id.
237. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
238. Id. at 752.
239. Id. at 753.
240. Id. at 750.
241. Id. at 753.
242. See Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J.
408, 427 (2010) (describing the strict scrutiny analysis as the “prevailing framework for dealing
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Because a substantive due process analysis “is to be tested by an
appraisal of the totality of facts in a given case”243 to determine whether
the conduct is “shocking to the universal sense of justice,”244 there
likely will be instances where conditions of confinement have a
“mutually enforcing effect” and “produce[] the deprivation” of due
process in tandem.245 Logically, the gravity of harm caused by
overdetention is magnified where it both occurs under unconstitutional
conditions and is “excessive in relation to” the government’s legitimate
interest in ensuring detainees’ appearance at trial for the vast majority
of individuals.246 Prolonged detention in a jail with deplorable
conditions, such as amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, is a prime
example of such harm.247 The Third Circuit recognized the inherent
difficulty in isolating its analysis to each of the detainee’s two due
process claims where they suffered separate constitutional violations
that occurred in tandem—prolonged pretrial detention in abysmal
conditions of confinement—which aggravated the severity of their
overdetention due process claim.248 The Court’s recognition that the
substantive due process rights of an individual are violated when an
individual is overdetained, especially where that detention
accompanies parallel due process right violations, is necessary to frame
an analysis that takes into account the totality of the circumstances
when reviewing length-of-confinement claims.

with substantive due process claims” by “identifying a narrow category of liberty interests that
are deemed sufficiently ‘fundamental’ to warrant heightened scrutiny and ‘forbids the
government to infringe . . . “fundamental” liberty interests at all . . . unless the infringement is
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest’” (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302
(1993))).
243. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 850 (1998) (quoting Betts v. Brady, 316
U.S. 455, 462 (1942)); see also Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564, 570 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[A]n
investigation into substantive due process involves an appraisal of the totality of the circumstances
rather than a formalistic examination of fixed elements . . . .”).
244. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 850 (quoting Betts, 316 U.S. at 462).
245. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991).
246. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 398 (2015).
247. See Levin, supra note 25 (describing overcrowded conditions in ICE facilities during the
height of the COVID-19 pandemic).
248. German-Santos v. Warden Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility, 965 F.3d 203, 212–13 (3d Cir. 2020)
(reasoning that, where an individual was detained for two-and-a-half years prior to trial “in prison
alongside convicted criminals,” the court “[could not] ignore the conditions of confinement” that
“[d]espite its civil label, [makes] his detention . . . indistinguishable from criminal punishment”
(quoting Chavez-Alvarez v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, 783 F.3d 469, 478 (3d Cir. 2015),
abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018))).
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D. Rational Basis Review Is Insufficient To Protect Detainees’ Due
Process Claims
Detainees jailed in both pretrial criminal and immigration
detention face the common obstacle of rational basis review—as long
as the government can assert a rational basis for the regulation, it will
survive a constitutional challenge.249 The government’s interest in
protecting the community from suspected dangerous individuals and
ensuring an individual’s appearance at trial is indisputably
“legitimate.” However, where “the rules governing detention fail to
draw any distinction among those who are detained—suggesting that
all may be subject to rules designed for the most dangerous few”—a
more demanding level of scrutiny than rational basis review should
apply before condemning an individual for weeks, months, or even
years prior to trial.250
Restoring pretrial detention to its regulatory purpose requires
imposing a heightened degree of scrutiny to instances where
individuals face prolonged detention prior to a rendering of guilt. The
current standard, which evaluates overdetention claims relative to the
government’s legitimate regulatory purpose, has permitted the narrow
“exception” laid out in Salerno to swallow the rule.251 The Court itself
has pronounced, “The principle that there is a presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and
elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the
administration of our criminal law.”252 Given the fundamental nature
of the right to be free from overdetention—and the fact that it is
intertwined with other “fundamental guarantees,” specifically the
Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and Eighth Amendment

249. Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695,
712 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“The rational basis test requires that [the plaintiff] prove that the
government’s restrictions bear no rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.”); FCC v.
Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (“[T]hose attacking the rationality of the
legislative classification have the burden ‘to negative every conceivable basis which might support
it’. . . .” (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973))); see also
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 585 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The requirement that restraints
have a rational basis provides an individual with virtually no protection against punishment.”).
250. Bell, 441 U.S. at 588.
251. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987).
252. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).
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prohibition against excessive bail253—pretrial detainees’ overdetention
claims should be evaluated with greater scrutiny than the current
rational basis standard.254
A strict scrutiny analysis would require the government to assert
both a compelling interest to justify the deprivation of the detainee’s
fundamental right to liberty and that the chosen means—continued
detention—are “the most narrowly drawn means” of protecting the
public and ensuring the defendant’s appearance at trial.255 This Note
uses the courts’ treatment of Second Amendment claims—which,
depending on the aspect of the right infringed by a regulation, receive
varying degrees of scrutiny—as a model for assigning scrutiny that
increases in tandem with the length of detention and presence of
additional factors, including conditions of confinement.256
Jurisprudence surrounding the Second Amendment provides a
potential model for how the circuits, lacking clear guidance from the
Supreme Court on which tier of scrutiny to apply, could approach
detainees’ claims. The Court in District of Columbia v. Heller257
rejected rational basis review of regulations burdening the Second
Amendment right, but it declined to announce what level of scrutiny
alleged violations of the Second Amendment should receive going

253. See United States v. Ailemen, 165 F.R.D. 571, 577–78 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (interpreting
freedom from “excessive pretrial detention . . . as a right guaranteed by substantive due process”
and recognizing its intersection with other “enumerated fundamental rights”).
254. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978) (“When a statutory classification
significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is
supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those
interests.”).
255. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 189 (1986) (“[T]o prevail [under the strict scrutiny
standard], the State would have to prove that the statute is supported by a compelling interest
and is the most narrowly drawn means of achieving that end.”).
256. See, e.g., Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[W]e
apply intermediate scrutiny precisely because the District’s laws do not affect the core right
protected by the Second Amendment.”); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 471 (4th
Cir. 2011) (“While we find the application of strict scrutiny important to protect the core right of
the self-defense of a law-abiding citizen in his home . . . a lesser showing is necessary with respect
to laws that burden the right to keep and bear arms outside of the home.”). Relatedly, courts
apply varying levels of scrutiny to First Amendment claims. For example, under the First
Amendment, a court will apply strict scrutiny to content-based restrictions. E.g., Sable Commc’ns
of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). By contrast, non-content-based restrictions that
incidentally restrict speech, such as time, place, and manner restrictions, receive intermediate
scrutiny. E.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968).
257. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
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forward.258 On remand, the D.C. Circuit reasoned that “the level of
scrutiny applicable under the Second Amendment surely ‘depends on
the nature of the conduct being regulated and the degree to which the
challenged law burdens the right.’”259 Because the District of
Columbia’s registration requirements did not burden the core of the
Second Amendment right,260 the court applied intermediate scrutiny to
the challenged regulations.261 The majority of circuits have adopted a
two-step inquiry to determine the constitutionality of gun regulations,
asking first whether the contested regulation burdens a right protected
by the Second Amendment (and whether that right lies at the core or
periphery of the Second Amendment), and second, whether that
regulation survives the appropriate level of constitutional muster based
on the nature of the burdened right.262
To analogize to the pretrial detention context, an initial
determination under the BRA—which survived a facial challenge
under rational basis review in Salerno—would be subject to more
demanding scrutiny when that detention becomes prolonged and
“proportionately [harder] to justify.”263 Finally, although not all
substantive due process rights receive a higher degree of scrutiny than
rational basis review,264 the Court’s recognition that liberty from

258. Id. at 628 n.27 (reasoning that the rational basis test is appropriate “when evaluating laws
. . . that are themselves prohibitions on irrational laws [citing an example of a case under the Equal
Protection clause]” but “[o]bviously, the same test could not be used to evaluate the extent to
which a legislature may regulate a specific, enumerated right”).
259. Heller, 670 F.3d at 1257 (quoting United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682 (4th Cir.
2010)).
260. Id. at 1258 (applying intermediate scrutiny where “none of the District’s registration
requirements prevents an individual from possessing a firearm in his home or elsewhere, whether
for self-defense or hunting, or any other lawful purpose”).
261. Id. at 1257 (reasoning that “a regulation that imposes a substantial burden upon the core
right of self-defense protected by the Second Amendment” demands a stronger justification than
a law burdening the periphery of the right (emphasis added)).
262. See, e.g., id. at 1252–53 (applying a two-step inquiry under the Second Amendment to
determine the constitutionality of the challenged law); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 701–
04 (7th Cir. 2011) (same); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010)
(same); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800–01 (10th Cir. 2010) (same); United States v.
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010) (same).
263. Heller, 670 F.3d at 1245.
264. See id. at 1256 (reasoning that “the Supreme Court often applies strict scrutiny to
legislation that impinges upon a fundamental right” but “it does not logically follow, that strict
scrutiny is called for whenever a fundamental right is at stake”); cf. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456,
461 (1988) (“[C]lassifications affecting fundamental rights are given the most exacting scrutiny.”
(citation omitted)); W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (applying rational
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arbitrary government restraint—such as prolonged detention—lies at
“the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause”265
demands more than the most lenient degree of scrutiny available.
Applying heightened scrutiny to prolonged detention claims reflects
the Court’s “expan[sion of] the meaning of ‘liberty’ under the Due
Process Clause to include certain implied ‘fundamental rights’ . . .
[which] cannot be limited at all, except by provisions that are ‘narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.’”266
E. Reconciling Due Process with the INA’s Mandatory Detention and
Postremoval Detention Statutes
Concurring in Demore, Justice David Souter emphasized that
“selecting a class of people for confinement on a categorical basis,” and
denying that class any rights to an individual determination of their
status was a denial of due process.267 This is precisely what the INA’s
mandatory detention statute accomplishes in the pre-removal hearing
context.268 The Supreme Court has twice refused, first in Demore and
again in Jennings, to impose any temporal limitation on the length of
mandatory detention without bond in removal proceedings.269
Meanwhile, the average length of removal proceedings in 2018 was 501
days, or about sixteen and a half months, and decisions granting asylum
basis review in upholding Washington’s minimum wage law, reasoning that “[l]iberty under the
Constitution is thus necessarily subject to the restraints of due process, and regulation which is
reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the community is due
process,” and overturning Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), where the Court
held that laws restricting the freedom of contract were a violation of substantive due process, id.
at 561–62).
265. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992).
266. Kerry v. Din, 576 U.S. 86, 92 (2015) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301–02
(1993)).
267. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 551–52 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
268. See, e.g., Casas-Castrillon v. DHS, 535 F.3d 942, 949 (9th Cir. 2008) (requiring a hearing
regarding the noncitizen detainee’s danger to community and flight risk); Guerrero-Sanchez v.
Warden York Cnty. Prison, 905 F.3d 208, 223 (3d Cir. 2018) (finding that the Due Process Clause
“may” bar prolonged detention where a detainee has no right to a bond hearing (emphasis
added)); Sopo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 825 F.3d 1199, 1217 (11th Cir. 2016), vacating as moot, 890 F.3d
952 (2018) (reasoning that the one-year mark typically signals the “outer limit of reasonableness”
for a noncitizen’s detention prior to a bond hearing).
269. Demore, 538 U.S. at 527–28 (declining to extend the presumptive ninety-day limit on
detention following a removal order in Zadvydas to detention prior to a removal hearing);
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 844 (2018) (holding that a six-month detention limit cannot
be read into statute).
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took an average of 1,064 days, or nearly three years.270 As of May 2018,
the Immigration Court had a backlog of 714,067 cases.271 “Detention
under § 1226(a) is frequently prolonged,” and “initial removal
determination proceedings . . . themselves can take months or years.”272
If a detainee is not awarded bond, “[t]here is no administrative
mechanism by which [they can] challenge[] [their] detention on the
ground that it reached an unreasonable length.”273 This dilemma
extends to a noncitizen’s detention following a final order of removal
that becomes prolonged due to the impossibility of removal, as in
Zadvydas, or in seeking withholding of removal. Pretrial criminal
detainees and noncitizens detained throughout removal proceedings
therefore face a similar dilemma—how to raise a due process claim
alleging overdetention when neither the Court nor Congress has
recognized any temporal limit on such detention.
A substantive due process analysis is appropriate in both
detention regimes because it recognizes the need to evaluate
overdetention claims on the facts of each individual’s detention, rather
than via imposition of the type of “bright-line” rule that the Court
rejected in Salerno, Demore, and Jennings. Dissenting in Jennings,
Justice Stephen Breyer highlighted:
The strongest basis for reading the Constitution’s bail
requirements as extending to these civil, as well as criminal, cases,
however, lies in the simple fact that the law treats like cases alike. And
reason tells us that the civil confinement at issue here and the pretrial
criminal confinement that calls for bail are in every relevant sense
identical. There is no difference in respect to the fact of confinement
itself. And I can find no relevant difference in respect to bail-related
purposes.274

The substantive due process analysis under both regimes is the
same—prolonged detention prior to a conviction or order of removal
in circumstances that “shock[] the conscience” is a violation of the Fifth

270. Immigration Court Backlog Jumps While Case Processing Slows, TRAC IMMIGR. (June
8, 2018), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/516 [https://perma.cc/3GLR-KRSY].
271. Id.
272. Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 852 (2d Cir. 2020) (emphasis added).
273. Id.
274. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 865 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Amendment’s Due Process Clause.275 A heightened standard of proof
requiring the government, in response to a detainee’s challenge on the
grounds that their detention is prolonged in violation of due process,
to show that it has narrowly tailored a continued detention
determination in light of an individual’s compelling interest in freedom
will return pretrial detention to its regulatory purpose—while still
serving the compelling government interest that exists for the
“dangerous few”276 who should be detained prior to trial.
V. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR OVERDETENTION DUE PROCESS
CLAIMS
Recognizing a six-month limit on detention following a final
removal order, the Zadvydas Court reasoned that it was “practically
necessary to recognize a presumptively reasonable [limit] of detention
. . . for the sake of uniform administration in the federal courts.”277 The
creation of a parallel standard for pretrial and pre-removal detention
would ease judicial administration of overdetention claims by relieving
the burden on judges to derive a new test for each case that comes
before the court. While due process claims should continue to be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis, establishing rough length-based
outlines for assessing overdetention claims can guide, but should not
dictate, a court’s analysis.
A. Innovation in the District Courts
The model laid out by the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California, which categorizes overdetention claims into
three length-based buckets, is a helpful starting point in formulating a
new standard.278 The court first remarked that “the constitutional ban
on excessive pretrial detention can be understood as a right guaranteed
by substantive due process.279 Next, the court “infer[red]” in the
absence of explicit Supreme Court guidance, that the proper approach

275. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (“So-called ‘substantive due process’
prevents the government from engaging in conduct that ‘shocks the conscience,’ or interferes with
rights ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’” (first quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165, 172 (1952); and then quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325–26 (1937))).
276. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 588 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
277. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 680 (2001).
278. United States v. Ailemen, 165 F.R.D. 571, 582 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
279. Id. at 577.
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involves balancing both the government’s regulatory goals in detaining
individuals pretrial with the length of that detention and “whether the
length of that detention outweighs . . . the interests that have been
identified and measured on the government’s side of the scales.”280 The
court highlighted the Supreme Court’s failure to provide guidance as
to how to conduct the balancing test, raising the exact questions and
frustrations this Note seeks to answer:
How do we value or ascribe weight to different lengths of
confinement? Does that process vary with or depend at all on
characteristics or circumstances of the individual defendant (e.g.,
should it matter whether the defendant is old, ill, or the kind of person
who suffers more in confinement than most others)? More significant,
when we compare apples (the government’s regulatory interests) with
oranges (the length of pretrial detention), how do we
ascribe relative value to each? How do we determine their relative
weight? And is the balancing analytically open-minded, or does it
start with the scales pre-weighted in some measure (how much?) in
favor of the government (whose detention law, Salerno and other
courts have held, is clearly supportable, in the abstract, by important
governmental interests)?281

The court first identified “a pattern . . . of analysis and outcome”
from the “many decisions where courts of appeals or district courts
have tried to solve these problems” in formulating a test to adjudicate
overdetention claims.282 The court recognized that typically, the courts
treated overdetention due process claims where the detention had
lasted less than one year as unripe.283 Where pretrial detention had
lasted between one to two years, the court cited the three “main factors
of the balancing analysis—length of delay, responsibility for
unnecessary delay, and flight/dangerousness.”284 Where detention
spanned more than two years, the court held that continued detention
could only survive a constitutional challenge where the government
was not responsible for the delay and special circumstances existed that
made the defendant’s release an extraordinary threat to the public.285

280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

Id. at 578–79.
Id. at 579.
Id.
Id. at 582.
Id. at 583.
Id. at 582–83.
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B. Proposing a Length-Based Model with Corresponding Tiers of
Scrutiny
The test proposed by the California district court reflects a
recognition by the court that varying levels of detention warrant
varying analyses. While helpfully identifying the “weakness of any
case-by-case balancing approach . . . [that] can vest excessive discretion
in judges and lead to inconsistent decision-making,”286 it does not
clarify what degree of scrutiny should apply to each class of detainees’
claims. Additionally, the court’s length-based sorting approach could
be overly permissive in certain circumstances by failing to recognize
that an individual’s fundamental right to be free from overdetention
could arise prior to the one-year mark, depending on an array of factors
including the charged offense, the detainee’s health, conditions of
confinement, and the availability of less restrictive means to ensure
their appearance at trial and community safety.287
Arguably, the first “bucket” in an overdetention analysis should
be tightened to the one-hundred-day mark, given the statutory limits
on pretrial detention imposed by the Speedy Trial Act and the Salerno
Court’s expectation that this would serve as a bulwark against abuse of
prolonged pretrial detention.288 At this point, a court should be
required to demonstrate that the detainee’s trial or hearing before an
286. Id. at 580.
287. For example, due to an inability to pay cash bond or meet another condition of bail, an
individual could be overdetained where they are “required to spend far more time behind bars
pretrial while they are presumed innocent than they will be required to serve after they are
convicted and are subject to punishment.” See Jones, supra note 87, at 936. This scenario reflects
the need for a more flexible test that recognizes that an overdetention may occur prior to one
year.
288. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987) (reasoning that “the maximum
length of pretrial detention is limited by the stringent time limitations of the Speedy Trial Act”);
see also supra note 33 and accompanying text. A one-hundred-day period—which is thirty days
beyond the threshold for tolling the Speedy Trial Act—mirrors a common threshold of many state
speedy trial statutes for detained persons, thereby providing a uniform standard that detainees
jailed by state and federal authorities may follow and ensuring that claims are ripe when they are
brought. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 23-1322(h)(1) (2021) (requiring that, in the case of a detained
individual, trial commence within 100 days); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1382 (West 2022) (requiring
that individuals charged with felonies be brought to trial within 60 days, and those charged with
misdemeanors to be brought within 30 to 45 days); PA. R. CRIM. P. 600(B) (limiting time a
detainee may spend in detention to 180 days); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.30 (McKinney 2022)
(setting various limits on the delay that a defendant may endure between arrest and trial based
on the level of offense, ranging from 30 to 189 days). It additionally reflects that, due to excludable
time under the Act, the period between arrest and trial is likely to endure beyond seventy days
before the ability to bring a viable challenge arises.
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immigration judge is “reasonably foreseeable”—or scheduled within
six months—in order to justify continued detention under rational
basis review.289 At the one-year mark—where detention has become
prolonged and there is no reasonably foreseeable possibility of
release—the government’s burden should increase from a legitimate to
compelling justification for ongoing detention, as the fundamental
right to be free from arbitrary government restraint is invoked.290 This
would require the state to prove “beyond a reasonable doubt” that
ongoing detention is warranted after one year.291
Beyond the length of detention, courts should also consider other
factors that may shift a detainee’s due process claim from one bucket
into another on an accelerated timeline. For example, the Second and
Third Circuits consider the nonspeculative length of future detention,
the weight of the inculpatory evidence, the seriousness of the charges,
the possibility of a severe sentence, the detainee’s criminal history, the
extent to which the government bears responsibility for the detention,
and any risk of dangerousness or flight if the detainee is released.292
The Eighth Circuit considers “the size of the detainee’s living space,”

289. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001) (holding that, after six months of
detention with “no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the
Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing”).
290. See supra notes 123–125 and accompanying text. There is evidence that imposing a
heightened standard at this stage would not overwhelm the courts, given that an average of 83
percent of felonies—at least at the state level—are resolved within one year and, as a result, the
courts would only be tasked with reconsidering detention determinations in the smaller subset of
unresolved cases where defendants had not been released on bail. BRIAN J. OSTROM, LYDIA E.
HAMBLIN, RICHARD Y. SCHAUFFLER & NIAL RAAEN, NAT’L CNTR. FOR STATE CTS., TIMELY
JUSTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES: WHAT THE DATA TELLS US 5 (2020), https://www.ncsc.org/__data/
assets/pdf_file/0019/53218/Timely-Justice-in-Criminal-Cases-What-the-Data-Tells-Us.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/JZF6-GFHX].
291. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 364, 368 (1997) (requiring Kansas to demonstrate
that “the detainee satisfies the same standards as required for the initial confinement”—that it is
“beyond a reasonable doubt” that the individual was a sexually violent predator—if it wishes to
confine an individual longer than one year and requiring “strict procedural safeguards” to ensure
constitutionality of civil commitment of sexually violent predators).
292. See United States v. Accetturo, 783 F.2d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 1986) (considering “the length
of the detention . . . , the complexity of the case,” and whether one side has intentionally added
to that complexity in order to delay trial); United States v. Gonzales Claudio, 806 F.2d 334, 340
(2d Cir. 1986) (“Though the duration of confinement is obviously a central focus of our [due
process] inquiry, we also consider the extent to which the prosecution bears responsibility for the
delay that has ensued and the strength of the evidence indicating risk of flight.”); United States v.
Gallo, 653 F. Supp. 320, 338 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (considering “length and hardships caused by
detention,” dangerousness of the defendant, and “any more closely tailored alternative regulatory
measure which might be used to secure against the predicted harm in a less restrictive manner”).
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time spent within that space each day, and opportunity to exercise in
weighing the gravity of harm caused by overdetention.293 The weighing
of such factors suggests that overdetention claims should continue to
be evaluated on a “case-by-case basis.”294
The same analysis can be applied to noncitizens’ overdetention
due process claims. In the wake of Jennings, which rejected an implicit
six-month time limitation on detention without a bond hearing,295 the
circuits have been reluctant to establish a bright-line rule establishing
when detention becomes unconstitutional.296 Dissenting in Jennings,
Breyer highlighted the discrepancy in treatment of noncitizens and
pretrial criminal detainees that this Note similarly seeks to elevate,
finding “no evidence suggesting that asylum seekers or other
noncitizens generally present a greater risk of flight than persons
imprisoned for trial where there is probable cause to believe that the
confined person has committed a crime” and suggesting this
determination should be done on a “case by case” basis.297
That other factors may worsen the constitutional harm
accompanying prolonged detention provides support for a substantive
due process analysis that considers the “totality of the
circumstances”298 to determine whether a practice is regulatory or
punitive. This analysis should be guided by the “framework for as-

293. Ferguson v. Cape Girardeau County, 88 F.3d 647, 650 (8th Cir. 1996).
294. See United States v. Gelfuso, 838 F.2d 358, 359 (9th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he due process limit
on the length of pretrial detention requires assessment on a case-by-case basis.”); Gonzales
Claudio, 806 F.2d at 340 (“[T]he due process limit on the duration of preventive detention
‘requires assessment on a case-by-case basis, since due process does not necessarily set a bright
line limit for length of pretrial confinement.’” (quoting United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64, 78–
79 (1986) (Feinberg, CJ., dissenting on other grounds), overruled by 481 U.S. 739 (1987))).
295. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 843 (2018) (reasoning that nothing in the text
of § 1225(b) “may plausibly be read to contain an implicit 6-month limit”).
296. See, e.g., Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 855 n.13 (2d Cir. 2020) (“This case does
not require us to establish a bright-line rule for when due process entitles an individual detained
under § 1226(a) to a new bond hearing with a shifted burden.”); German Santos v. Warden Pike
Cnty. Corr. Facility, 965 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2020) (declining to adopt a “bright-line threshold
at five months, six months, or one year” in favor of weighing the duration of detention along with
the expected length of future detention, reasons for the delay, and whether “the alien’s conditions
of confinement are ‘meaningfully different[ ]’ than criminal punishment” (alteration in original)
(quoting Chavez-Alvarez v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, 783 F.3d 469, 478 (3d Cir. 2015),
abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018))).
297. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 865 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
298. See Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564, 570 (7th Cir. 1998) (instructing that “an
investigation into substantive due process involves an appraisal of the totality of the circumstances
rather than a formalistic examination of fixed elements”).
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applied constitutional challenges” highlighted by the Third Circuit in a
recent post-Jennings overdetention case brought by a detainee held
under § 1226(c).299 There, the court inquired into (1) the foreseeable
length of future detention, (2) the party bearing responsibility for the
delay, and (3) “whether the alien’s conditions of confinement are
‘meaningfully different[]’ from criminal punishment.”300 The court
reasoned, “[I]f an alien’s civil detention under § 1226(c) looks penal,
that tilts the scales toward finding the detention unreasonable. And as
the length of detention grows, so does the weight that we give this
factor.”301 This framework reflects the analysis proposed above for
pretrial criminal detention. Where external factors contribute to the
punitive effect of pretrial detention, the constitutionality of such
detention is cast into question, and the Government’s burden to justify
the continued detention of the individual should increase in tandem
with the length of their detention.302
CONCLUSION
The sheer number of individuals jailed pretrial in conditions
defying belief—and microscope on conditions in jails amidst the
COVID-19 pandemic—should serve as an impetus for both Congress
and the courts to reexamine alternatives to detention and to restore the
practice to its regulatory use. The Supreme Court’s failure to resolve
the due process issue lurking in its recent overdetention decisions has
299. German Santos, 965 F.3d at 208.
300. Id. at 211 (alteration in original) (quoting Chavez-Alvarez, 783 F.3d at 478).
301. Id. (citation omitted).
302. An alternative—or ideally, companion to judicial intervention—is bail reform. Although
outside the scope of this Note, there is substantial literature on the benefits of eliminating cash
bail. See supra note 171. Much of this reform has occurred on a local level, as bipartisan efforts in
support of bail reform on the federal level—most recently the proposed Smarter Pretrial
Detention for Drug Charges Act introduced in the Senate in September 2020—have stalled. See
Smarter Pretrial Detention for Drug Charges Act of 2020, 116th Congress, S. 4549 (2020). The
proposed statute would remove the rebuttable presumption in favor of detaining federal drug
offenders pretrial and would allow judges to exercise discretion over this determination for
nonviolent drug offenders. Id. Although the proposed legislation would provide judges with more
discretion in granting bail to some detainees, it does not address the overarching problem of
restraining or monitoring the length of detention for those to whom bail is denied. Judges will
continue to adjudicate due process claims alleging overdetention for those detainees to whom the
legislation does not extend, unguided by clear precedent or a statutory limit on pretrial detention.
As a result, the due process analysis employed by a judge in one circuit may differ significantly
from that by judges in another circuit unless the Supreme Court clarifies the proper analysis for
overdetention claims. Ultimately it is the role of the Court, not that of Congress, to formulate a
uniform test that should guide the analysis into whether detention has exceeded its regulatory
mandate and become punitive in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
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forced judges to guess at the correct analysis in order to reconcile the
BRA and INA with the commands of due process under the Fifth
Amendment. The widespread use of detention illustrates the failure of
the existing precedents to protect individuals’ fundamental liberty
rights and demands the formulation of a uniform judicial framework to
adjudicate detainees’ overdetention due process claims.

